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THE MEANING, HISTORY, AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
ELECTIONS CLAUSE
Eliza Sweren-Becker and Michael Waldman*
Abstract: Historically, the Supreme Court has offered scant attention to or analysis of the
Elections Clause, resulting in similarly limited scholarship on the Clause’s original meaning
and public understanding over time. The Clause directs states to make regulations for the time,
place, and manner of congressional elections, and grants Congress superseding authority to
make or alter those rules.
But the 2020 elections forced the Elections Clause into the spotlight, with Republican
litigants relying on the Clause to ask the Supreme Court to limit which state actors can regulate
federal elections. This new focus comes on the heels of the Clause serving as the primary
constitutional basis for democracy reform legislation that passed the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2019 and was reintroduced in 2021. Increased interest heightens the need
for a deeper understanding of the intent and meaning of the Elections Clause. This Article fills
a gap in the literature by providing a first-of-its-kind comprehensive analysis of the purpose,
meaning, and interpretation of the Elections Clause by the Framers, early Congresses, and
federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Elections Clause—Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution—
has been rarely studied and infrequently adjudicated. That is changing.
The Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”1 In other words, the Elections Clause affirmatively directs
states to regulate federal congressional elections, but reserves to Congress
the superseding power to make its own regulations or to modify state
election law.
It is a provision of extraordinary, if often latent power. Nowhere else
in the original Constitution is Congress given explicit authority to “alter”
state laws even absent a conflicting federal statute. It is also one of the
few places in the Constitution where states are given an explicit
instruction to act—in this case, to ensure the continuation of the federal
legislature. Beyond the significance of this exertion of federal power,
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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what is noteworthy about the Clause is the motive that drove its inclusion:
a clear-eyed sense of the risk of political abuse by state lawmakers and
the unambiguous decision not to leave federal elections in their hands
alone.
Unexpectedly, the Elections Clause has emerged as the latest voting
rights battleground. In 2020, litigants filed more than forty cases raising
Elections Clause and Electors Clause2 claims, largely seeking to limit
voting access before the election or to overturn results after election day.3
Unlike bizarre claims about Dominion voting machines and a deceased
Venezuelan president,4 these cases had the patina of constitutional
seriousness. Today, in partisan voting rights battles, litigants focus on the
meaning of the word “legislature,” assuming it to restrict election
regulation only to elected representatives in each state capitol. They claim,
variously, that election officials, governors, or even state courts
interpreting state constitutions cannot act. From the founding era to the
present, one would have to look far and wide for evidence that the framers
sought to limit these actions only to legislators (as opposed to
understanding that language to refer to states generally). Indeed, suspicion
of those very legislators suffuses the purpose and history of the Clause.
After four justices—considering voting cases on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2020 “shadow docket”5—suggested that they would limit which
state entities can regulate federal elections under the Elections and

2. The Electors Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, directs how presidential electors are appointed by
the states. “[C]ourts have construed the Electors Clause coextensively with the Elections Clause,
holding that the former endows Congress with the same authority over presidential elections that the
latter grants it over congressional races.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Sweep of the Electoral
Power, 36 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 54 (2021); see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545
(1934); Voting Rts. Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The broad power given to
Congress over congressional elections has been extended to presidential elections . . . .”); Ass’n of
Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Article II
section 1] has been interpreted to grant Congress power over Presidential elections coextensive with
that which Article I section 4 grants it over congressional elections.”); Eugene Gressman, Uniform
Timing of Presidential Primaries, 65 N.C. L. REV. 351, 355 (1987) (“[T]he Court employs the same
constitutional analysis—the same broad treatment of vested congressional power—in dealing with
article II, section 1.”).
3. Voting Rights Litigation Tracker 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 8, 2021), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-tracker-2020 [https://perma.cc/4MD
M-628K].
4. Glenn Kessler, Fact-Checking the Craziest News Conference of the Trump Presidency, WASH.
POST (Nov. 19, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/19/factchecking-craziest-news-conference-trump-presidency/ [https://perma.cc/A6WR-8HFS].
5. The term “shadow docket,” coined by William Baude, refers to Supreme Court decisions decided
outside of its regular docket, without oral argument. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme
Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015).
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Electors Clauses,6 several petitioners sought certiorari to ask the Court to
limit which state entities can regulate federal elections.7
At the same time, the Elections Clause serves as the primary
constitutional rationale for federal democracy reform legislation to
expand and protect voting access, including the For the People Act, which
passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2019 and again in 2021, and
the Freedom to Vote Act (introduced in the Senate in September 2021).8
And the Elections Clause took center stage in the Supreme Court’s 2019
political gerrymandering decision, Rucho v. Common Cause.9 The Clause
was the subject of a 2015 ruling that allowed voters to enact election
reforms through ballot initiatives.10 In 2013, the Clause was the basis of a
case on the scope of the National Voter Registration Act.11 Understanding
the Elections Clause’s purpose, history, and application over more than
200 years is now essential.
Though the Elections Clause generated substantial friction during the
state constitutional ratification debates from 1787 to 1790, it is not widely

6. See, e.g., Wise v. Circosta, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020) (mem.) (Justices Thomas, Alito,
and Gorsuch would have granted an application to enjoin the North Carolina State Board of Elections’
extension of the state’s absentee ballot receipt deadline. The deadline extension was challenged based
on the claim that the Board is not the “legislature” under the Elections and Electors Clauses.);
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29–30 (2020) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (in denying an application to stay a Seventh Circuit decision—which stayed the district
court’s order to extend the ballot receipt deadline—Justice Gorsuch, concurring, wrote that state
legislatures, not judges or other state officials, bear primary responsibility for setting election rules);
id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Justice Kavanaugh agreed that designing electoral procedures
is a “legislative task”); Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 643 (2020) (mem.)
(Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would have granted an application to stay the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling to extend the mail ballot receipt deadline, which was challenged
based on the claim that the state court is not the “legislature” under the Elections and Electors
Clauses).
7. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Corman v. Pa. Democratic Party, 592 U.S. __, 141
S. Ct. 732 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-574); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Republican Party of Pa. v.
Degraffenreid, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 732 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-542); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Bognet v. Degraffenreid, __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20-740), 2021
WL 1520777. The Court declined to grant certiorari in Corman and Republican Party of Pennsylvania
v. Degraffenreid. The Court granted certiorari in Bognet before vacating the ruling and instructing the
lower court to dismiss the case as moot.
8. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1,
117th Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021). The Brennan Center for
Justice has advocated in support of the For the People Act, including offering testimony before
Congress in support of the legislation.
9. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). The Brennan Center for Justice submitted an amicus brief to
the Court in support of appellees.
10. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015). The
Brennan Center for Justice submitted an amicus brief to the Court in support of appellees.
11. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013). The Brennan Center for Justice
submitted an amicus brief to the Court in support of respondents.
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known, at least as far as constitutional provisions go. Congress did not
legislate pursuant to its power under the Elections Clause until 1842,12 and
the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its meaning until 1879.13 In a
nearly unbroken string of cases since then, the Court has deemed
uncontroversial a wide range of elections regulations. But the Court did
not engage in a robust analysis of the provision’s history until 2013.14
Given the Court’s scant attention, scholarship on the Clause—especially
its original meaning and public understanding over time—has been
limited and is typically directed to the relationship between the Elections
Clause and a specific issue.15 This Article builds on this literature by
providing a comprehensive examination of the purpose, meaning, and
understanding of the Elections Clause over time.
The full sweep of the history of the Clause—from its drafting to the
current day—tells a clear story. It was understood from the start to give

12.
13.
14.
15.

Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. at 7–9.
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114
YALE L.J. 1021 (2005) (justiciability of partisan gerrymandering); Troy McCurry, Leeway for
Judicial Usurpation: Ignoring the Default of the Elections Clause in the Texas Redistricting Cases,
25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 631 (2007) (same); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the
Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2010) (campaign finance);
Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (Elections Clause, when combined with Congress’s ability to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, provides constitutional justification for the VRA); MICHAEL
J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 340–48
(2016) (discussing Antifederalist views of and arguments against the Elections Clause); Franita
Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. REV. 317, 317 (2019)
[hereinafter Tolson, Congressional Authority] (exploring the breadth of congressional power over
elections, which derives from multiple sources of congressional authority and should overcome
federalism concerns); Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal
Law, 129 YALE L.J. F. 171 (2019) (addressing Congress’s Elections Clause authority to enact the For
the People Act of 2019 (H.R. 1)); Recent Legislation, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (2020) (addressing
anti-commandeering under the Elections Clause in the contest of H.R. 1). But see Stephanopoulos,
supra note 2 (writing more broadly on congressional authority over elections). A separate line of
scholarship addresses the “independent state legislature” theory. See Michael T. Morley, The
Independent
State
Legislature
Doctrine,
Federal
Elections,
and
State
Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV 1 (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353013
6 [https://perma.cc/P5GC-PXHU]; Vikram David Amar, Federal Court Review of State Court
Interpretations of State Laws that Regulate Federal Elections: Debunking the “Independent State
Legislature” Notion Once and for All, and Keeping Federal Judges to Their Important but Limited
Lanes (Nov. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3731755 [https://perma.cc/NFM4-ZPEC]; Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and the
Elections Clause, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 726–28, 734 (2016); Michael T. Morley, The New
Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79 (2016); Richard L. Hasen, When
“Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the
Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (2008); Hayward H. Smith, Comment, History
of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001).
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Congress extraordinary power over federal elections. Some derided it for
this reason; others welcomed that federal oversight; all took it for granted.
It was an important, if narrow, aspect of the Constitution’s federalist
clockwork machinery. From the start, the Elections Clause was motivated
by great and still-relevant constitutional goals: to guarantee and amplify
basic democratic rights by ensuring fair and accurate representation, and
by precluding tactics that could be used by incumbent factions and parties
to blunt representation and exclude voters.
Part I analyzes the drafting of the Elections Clause along with the state
constitutional ratification and public debates on the provision. Part II
considers the early congressional record and Congress’s understanding of
its authority under the Elections Clause. Part III explores the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Clause. And Part VI explains the importance
of the Elections Clause for today’s legal and political fights about our
democracy.
I.

THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AT THE FOUNDING

A.

The Constitutional Convention

1.

The Framers’ Goals

The Framers’ inclusion of the Elections Clause was driven by two
overlapping concerns of current relevance: a focus on representation and
a distrust of state lawmakers.
First, the Framers cared passionately about representation.16 As every
American schoolchild knows, a fighting slogan was “No taxation without
representation.”17 Americans understood the risks of electoral
manipulation to minimize effective representation—manipulation they
saw in England, and to a degree in their own pre-revolutionary past.
During the fight over British repressive acts that led up to the
revolution, Americans bristled at the notion that they need not be
represented directly in parliament. Britain insisted that virtual
representation was enough. In the colonies, where many more people
owned land and the electorate was a larger share of the population than in
Britain, especially in the north, actual representation was deemed a
necessary aspect of legitimate government.
16. See generally J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND & THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1966).
17. Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without Representation” Versus
Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (“That ‘no taxation without
representation’ was the rallying cry of colonists seeking their independence in 1776 is the ‘mother’s
milk’ of American history education. Generations of schoolchildren have been weaned on it.”).
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British parliamentary seats were notoriously malapportioned. The
booming industrial cities of Birmingham and Manchester had no
representation.18 On the other hand, a verdant hilltop known as Old Sarum
had a seat in parliament.19 Britain had ample reason to avoid the topic. As
one historian writes, “Heeding American arguments about representation
of the colonists in Parliament would open up a Pandora’s box of defective
representation in Britain.”20
In American colonies, on the other hand, new towns were awarded
legislative seats. Larger communities, such as Philadelphia and Boston,
were awarded extra seats. As tensions rose, the Crown attempted to
manipulate this practice. In Pennsylvania, it refused to add legislative
representation when new towns were incorporated.
John Adams articulated the colonists’ focus on ensuring the
representative nature of legislatures in his Thoughts on Government,
written in the spring of 1776 as the Continental Congress was preparing
to formally declare independence.
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be
employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should
be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should
think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest
of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an
equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the
people should have equal interest in it.21
Others echoed Adams’s words.22
As the revolutionaries established new governments, they kept an eye
on the need to ensure accurate representation. One pamphlet, possibly
written by Thomas Paine,23 proposed that “A Constitution should lay
down some permanent ratio, by which the representation should
18. CHARLES SEYMOUR, ELECTORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 349, 490–91 (1915).
19. Stephen Farrell, Old Sarum, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamento
nline.org/volume/1820-1832/constituencies/old-sarum [https://perma.cc/5FR8-Y7DD].
20. R.B. BERNSTEIN, THE EDUCATION OF JOHN ADAMS 52 (2020).
21. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, April 1776, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0026-0004
[https://perma.cc/FB3EYNSE]; JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 50–62 (1989); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 161–75 (1967).
22. See, e.g., THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE ESSEX RESULT, 1778, reprinted in THE POPULAR
SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 341 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Flug Handlin eds., 1966) (“They
should think, feel, and act like them, and in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents.”).
23. See Gary Berton, Smiljana Petrovic, Lubomir Ivanov, & Robert Schiaffino, Examining the
Thomas Paine Corpus: Automated Computer Authorship Attribution Methodology Applied to Thomas
Paine’s Writings, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THOMAS PAINE STUDIES 40–41 (Scott Cleary & Ivy Linton
Stabell, eds., 2016).
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afterwards encrease or decrease with the number of inhabitants; for the
right of representation, which is a natural one, ought not to depend upon
the will and pleasure of future legislatures.”24
The second impetus for the inclusion of the Elections Clause came from
a strong distrust of state lawmakers. During the “Critical Period” between
the victory in the war and the 1787 gathering in Philadelphia, the newly
independent states offered ample evidence of the self-dealing and political
corruption of local-minded officials.25 Indeed, as one Framer put it, the
Constitutional Convention was appointed specifically because of the
“corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States.”26 The
Constitution was intended to rectify the weak Articles of Confederation,
under which the national government had little leverage over States. The
Confederation Congress could not impose taxes, enact statutes, regulate
international or interstate commerce, or enforce treaty obligations. States
operated largely out of self-interest. For example, New York enacted its
own import duties in 1784, generating substantial revenue and keeping its
property taxes low, leading to the state’s reluctance to approve an
amendment to the Articles that would have permitted federal taxing.27
Madison’s diligent preparation for the convention included thorough
study of all the ways state governments had frustrated the national
interest.28 That distrust permeated the final Constitution.
2.

Drafting the Elections Clause and Debate at the Constitutional
Convention

The Elections Clause came together over the course of fifteen days in
the summer of 1787. Between July 26 and August 6, a five-member

24. FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS 18–24 (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 639 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
25. See JOHN FISKE, CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-1789 (Forgotten Books 2012)
(1888).
26. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 288 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 2 Farrand] (notes of James Madison, recording arguments of John Francis Mercer); see
also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352 (2009)
(“Corruption was discussed more often in the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or
instability.”).
27. KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 31.
28. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0187
[https://perma.cc/N99 G-Z4XQ]; 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 119–20 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 5
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (noting in the debates of July 25, 1788 that the States repeatedly failed to heed
the Confederation Congress, failed to fulfill their national obligations, and even tried to keep secret
their defiance of Congress).
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Committee of Detail29 pulled together a first draft of the Constitution
based on the resolutions approved to date.30 Over successive versions, the
Clause’s broad purpose to protect the integrity of elections came into
view.
An early version produced by the Committee of Detail focused only on
the timing of congressional elections.31 Over the next four drafts, the
Committee of Detail coalesced around broader language that grew to
include authority over the manner of elections.32 The sixth draft,
significantly, introduced the notion that the Clause protects not just the
frequency of elections, but the qualification of voters.33 But by later drafts,
the language had been boiled down to a more concise wording.34 When
John Rutledge (S.C.) delivered the Committee’s report on August 6, the
Elections Clause read: “The times and places and [the] manner of holding
the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the
Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at
any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States.”35
As the Clause evolved, the Committee toyed with various roles for
Congress (the August 6 version did not yet include its power to “make”
elections regulations, an authority added by amendment on August 9). But
the drafters consistently preserved Congress’s veto power over state
regulations of federal elections.
On August 9, 1787, when the full federal convention considered the

29. The Committee of Detail was comprised of Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, Oliver
Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and Nathaniel Gorham. See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 173.
30. See id. at 147; 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 129–74.
31. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 135 (“The Time of the Election of the Members of the H. D. and
of the Meeting of U. S. in C. assembled.”).
32. Id. at 139 (“The elections shall be biennially held on the same day through the same state(s):
except in case of accidents, and where an adjournment to the succeeding day may be
necessary. . . . The place shall be fixed by the (national) legislatures from time to time, or on their
default by the national legislature. . . . So shall the presiding officer . . . (Votes shall be given by
ballot, unless 2/3 of the national legislature shall choose to vary the mode.)”) (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 153 (Committee of Detail, VI, Article 4: “The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be chosen every second Year (in the Manner following) by the People of the several States
comprehended within this Union (the Time and Place and the Manner and the of holding the Elections
and the Rules) The Qualifications of the Electors shall be (appointed) prescribed by the Legislatures
of the several States; but their provisions (which they shall make concerning them shall be subject to
the Control of) concerning them may at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the
United States.”) (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 165 (Committee of Detail, IX, Article 6: “The Times and Places and the Manner of
holding the Elections of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each
State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered (or superseded) by the
Legislature of the United States.”).
35. Id. at 179.
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proto-Elections Clause, delegates proposed several amendments.36
Among the suggested changes was an addition to Congress’s power—the
authority to make (not just “alter”) regulations for congressional elections.
In his notes, James Madison explained that the delegates added this
authority “in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.”37 This fear,
that states might not set up rules for congressional elections at all,
permeated state ratification debates and congressional debates all the way
through Reconstruction. One reason for the provision was the concern that
state legislators would try to strangle the new government by refusing to
hold federal elections at all.38 That fear was not far-fetched. Local
potentates such as Patrick Henry, who dominated the Virginia legislature,
and George Clinton, who held sway in Albany as New York’s governor,
would prove the new Constitution’s most dogged foes.39 There was a risk
the whole experiment could collapse.
One of the amendments proposed that day generated meaningful
debate. John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney represented South Carolina,
a state with a notoriously malapportioned legislature, with large coastal
plantations far better represented than newly populated inland areas.40
They moved to strike from the Elections Clause the phrase, “but their
provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature
of the United States.”41 According to Madison’s notes, Rutledge and
Pinckney argued that the “States . . . could & must be relied on in such
cases.”42 The delegates from the nascent union’s most gerrymandered
state (before that word was invented) aimed to strike Congress’s power to
do anything about it.
Several delegates rose to defend the congressional veto. Nathaniel
Ghorum remarked that the absence of congressional authority over
elections would be just as improper as county control over British
parliamentary elections.43 Rufus King warned that the absence of a
congressional override would repeat the mistakes of the Articles of
36. Id. at 229.
37. Id. at 242.
38. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 59, 77, 84.
40. The western “back country” contained as much as seventy-five percent of the colony’s white
population and was settled by yeoman farmers who enslaved relatively few people. James Haw,
Political Representation in South Carolina, 1669-1794: Evolution of a Lowcountry Tradition, 103
S.C. HIST. MAG. 106, 112 (2002). As described in greater detail infra section I.B.1, South Carolina’s
malapportionment was repeatedly offered as an example during state ratification debates to
demonstrate the need for superseding congressional authority under the Elections Cause.
41. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Confederation.44 Following King’s rejection of the “dangerous” and
“fatal” idea that the federal government should depend on state
lawmakers, Gouverneur Morris warned that, without congressional
authority, states might make “false returns” and then fail to hold new
elections.45 Roger Sherman expressed “sufficient confidence in the State
Legislatures,” but still approved of congressional authority.46
Madison offered the most extensive defense (at least according to his
own notes), along with an explanation of the purpose and scope of the
Elections Clause.47 He described the Clause as containing “words of great
latitude,” stressing the many ways that states could misuse their
authority.48 And recognizing that state lawmakers would abuse their
power in ways that were impossible to predict at the time, he warned that
the Elections Clause was needed to prevent self-interested partisans from
twisting election rules to benefit their faction. Given its singular
importance, we quote Madison’s defense of the provision in full:
The necessity of a Genl. Govt. supposes that the State
Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common
interest at the expense of their local conveniency or prejudices.
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of
Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the
States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by
the mode, This view of the question seems to decide that the
Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right
of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections.
These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee
all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power.
Whether the electors should vote by ballot or vivâ voce, should
assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into
districts or all meet at one place, shd all vote for all the
representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the
district; these & many other points would depend on the
Legislatures. and might materially affect the appointments.
Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry,
they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the
44. Id. at 241.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Madison requested that his notes be published posthumously, a full half century later in 1840.
See THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Henry D. Gilpin ed., 1840); James H. Hutson, The Creation of
the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986). Madison
was known to have edited and “improved” the transcripts, including his own contributions. Hutson,
supra, at 25–35; KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 135–36.
48. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240–41.
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candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the
Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would
produce a like inequality in their representation in the Natl.
Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the
power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the
latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power
to the Natl. Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1. of a Senate
to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could
be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of
Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State
Legislatures; surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must
be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle — though
it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State
Legislatures this great authority over the election of the
Representatives of the people in the Genl. Legislature, as it would
be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their
Representatives in the State Legislatures.49
Particularly focused on fair representation, Madison echoed these
concerns during the Virginia ratification debates a year later, “Elections
are regulated now unequally in some States; particularly South-Carolina,
with respect to Charleston, which is represented by 30 Members.”50
Madison’s denunciation of the likely machinations of self-interested
state politicians seemed to have stilled the debate in Philadelphia. He
recorded no subsequent interjections. Before moving on to consider other
provisions of the new Constitution, the delegates agreed to the Elections
Clause. The vote was unanimous.51
B.

Ratification of the Constitution

Publication of the Constitution in September 1787 led to a roaring
national debate. Antifederalists cautioned that the Constitution would
concentrate too much power in the new central government. The Elections
Clause was one target for their fire. Antifederalists warned the provision
would let Congress manipulate elections. In his pathbreaking 1961 study
of the debate over ratification, historian Jackson Turner Main observed
that this seemingly frivolous objection to the Elections Clause was “of

49. Id. at 240–41.
50. THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION: DEBATES (JUNE 14, 1788), reprinted in 10 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA [3], at 1259–60 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter VOL. 10 VIRGINIA 3] (emphasis in original).
51. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 242.
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great importance, judging from the number of times it was introduced.”52
1.

State Ratification Debates

Records indicate the Elections Clause was discussed at the ratification
conventions in nine of thirteen states53 and was the subject of proposed
amendments from at least six states. Every state that proposed specific
amendments included one to trim or eliminate the clause.54
Defenders of the Elections Clause repeatedly expressed an unvarnished
distrust of state legislatures. For example, in Massachusetts, George Cabot
argued that if state lawmakers exclusively regulated congressional
elections “they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate that controul
[sic] of the general government, which the people ought always to have
through their immediate representatives—as one of the people, . . . the 4th
section is to be as highly prized as any in the constitution.”55 Others
warned against relying, even “for a moment, on the will of state
legislatures,” and expressed concern about state lawmakers trying to
exercise “undue influence in elections” and making “improper
regulations” arising from “sinister views.”56

52. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781–1788,
at 149–51 (2d ed. 2017).
53. No such debate was found in records of the Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, and New Jersey
ratification debates (in Elliot’s Debates or the Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution). These four states ratified the Constitution most quickly. The vote was unanimous in
Delaware, Georgia, and New Jersey; in Connecticut, the margin in favor of ratification was more than
three to one. KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 422–23.
54. MAIN, supra note 52, at 151.
55. THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION: CONVENTION DEBATES (Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in 6
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [3], at 1217 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3] (emphasis in original).
56. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: DEBATES (June 25, 1788), in 22 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: NEW YORK [4], at 1906 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008)
[hereinafter VOL. 22: NEW YORK 4] (“Richard Morris suggested that so far as the people, distinct
from their legislatures, were concerned in the operation of the constitution, it was absolutely necessary
that the existence of the general government should not depend, for a moment, on the will of the state
legislatures. The power of perpetuating the government ought to belong to their federal
representatives; otherwise, the rights of the people would be essentially abridged.”); Plain Truth:
Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1788,
reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 222 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA] (“Congress indeed are to have control to
prevent undue influence in elections, which we all know but too often happens through party zeal.”);
Text of a Federalist Speech Not Delivered in the Maryland Convention, MD. J. (July 21, 1788),
reprinted in 12 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MARYLAND [2], at 884 (John
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015) (“It has been said, that congress will be more likely to make improper
regulations, than the general assembly. But that is an assertion without foundation, because although
we may easily suppose improper regulations to take place in a state assembly, from the prevalence
and sinister views of a party . . . .”).
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Backers worried that balky states would simply refuse to participate in
federal elections.57 Rhode Island’s refusal to send delegates to Congress
and the Constitutional Convention was top-of-mind.58 Indeed, in New
York, supporters of George Clinton would manage to stall the first House
election in two districts in 1788.59 At times, supporters assured antifederalists that the purpose of the Clause was simply to ensure that states
held elections. At the first ratification convention the prominent lawyer
James Wilson claimed the Clause was needed for “the very existence of
the federal government.”60 The authority would not be abused because
Congress would act only “to correct the improper regulations of a
particular state.”61 James Iredell attempted to soothe critics by explaining
that the provision would only be used when states failed to hold elections,
such as in case of a military invasion (and even proposed an amendment
along those lines).62
But many federalists, as well as antifederalists, saw the power given to
Congress to be far more sweeping than just one to be used if a state refused
to hold elections. Just as at the Constitutional Convention, proponents
warned that powerful factions within states would use unchecked control
over elections to gerrymander districts and entrench their power.
57. See Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA,
CONNECTICUT 526 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter VOL. 3 DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY,
GEORGIA, CONNECTICUT] (“The regulating the time, place, and manner of elections seems to be as
well secured as possible. The legislature of each state may do it, and if they neglect to do it in the best
manner, it may be done by Congress; and what motive can either have to injure the people in the
exercise of that right?”); Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788),
reprinted in VOL. 3 DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, CONNECTICUT, supra, at 569; THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, reprinted in VOL.
2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 402–03, 406 (statements of James Wilson); 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 60 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“It would have been a solecism, to have
a government without any means of self-preservation. The Confederation is the only instance of a
government without such means, and is a nerveless system, as inadequate to every purpose of
government as it is to the security of the liberties of the people of America. When the councils of
America have this power over elections, they can, in spite of any faction in any particular state, give
the people a representation.”) (replicating a statement of William R. Davie) (emphasis in original).
58. See THEOPHILUS PARSONS: NOTES OF CONVENTION DEBATES (Jan. 16, 1788), reprinted in
VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1210–11 (noting Theodore Sedgwick’s statement: “But
this controlling power is necessary to preserve the general government . . . Attend to the conduct of
Rhode Island last winter; without any reason, they recalled their delegate and refused to send any.
The same may happen under the general government”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57 (noting
the statement of William R. Davie addressing “the little state of Rhode Island”).
59. FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 7 (1974).
60. Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, reprinted in VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note
56, at 565 (Dec. 11, 1787).
61. Id. at 565–66.
62. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 53–54.
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Theophilus Parsons, who later became Massachusetts’s chief justice,
spoke at the commonwealth’s ratifying convention in January 1788.
During the ratification debate, he warned of abuse in prescient and eerily
modern language:
But a state legislature, under the influence of their senators, who
would have their fullest confidence, or under the influence of
ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular
commotion, and when faction and party spirit run high, would
introduce such regulations as would render the rights of the
people insecure and of little value. They might make an unequal
and partial division of the State into districts for the election of
representatives, or they might even disqualify one third of the
electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can have
no remedy[.]63
The Elections Clause, Parsons explained, “provides a remedy—A
controuling power in a legislature, composed of senators and
representatives of twelve States, without the influence of our commotions
and factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore to the
people their equal and sacred rights of election.”64 According to Parsons,
the Elections Clause vested superseding power in Congress to “secur[e]
to the people their equal rights of election.”65
Indeed, federalists warned that voter suppression tactics by state
lawmakers would make it harder for voters to be heard. For example,
James Wilson, arguing for the Constitution, noted with a shiver that
Pennsylvania’s elections could be moved to far-west Pittsburgh.66 Thomas
McKean (Pennsylvania’s chief justice) asked, if States directed that votes
be cast by voice, Congress must be authorized to change that mode to
secret ballot “to preserve the suffrages of the citizens from bias and
influence[.]”67 He later explained that it is Congress’s duty to ensure that
its members were “fairly chosen” and, to do so, “it is proper they should
have it in their power to provide that the times, places, and manner of
election should be such as to insure free and fair elections.”68 One
Massachusetts commentator explained, a state “might abuse the
inhabitants, by appointing a place for holding the elections, which would
prevent some from attending, and burthen [sic] others with very great
inconveniences. These are cases in which the supreme power must
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1218.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 403.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 537.
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interpose, and abuses which none but it can rectify.”69
In particular, Elections Clause proponents sought to avoid the
malapportionment that had plagued England and reemerged in South
Carolina. One essayist explained that, in England,
the people have by no means an equal representation, even in the
house of commons, the only popular branch of their legislature.
The old, decayed, and almost forgotten borough of Sarum, sends
two members to parliament, when Bristol, the second town in the
kingdom, sends only two. London, which contains at least the
seventh part of the inhabitants of England, does not furnish the
hundredth part of the representation in parliament.70
Early in 1788, at the Massachusetts ratification, Rufus King described that
under South Carolina’s constitution, Charleston held a disproportionate
number of seats in the state’s General Assembly and refused to “alter[] of
this unequal mode of representation” even though the population had
grown in “[t]he back parts of Carolina.”71 If South Carolina’s legislature
had unchecked power to draw congressional districts, congressional
“representatives, therefore, from that State, will not be chosen by the
people, but will be the representatives of a faction of that State.”72 King
then asked, “[i]f the general government cannot control in this case, how
are the people secure?”73
In addition, federalists urged national uniformity.74 According to one
Maryland commenter, the “great object” of the Framers at the convention
“appears to have been, to institute a government as uniform and equal in
all its parts, as could be accomplished. It was foreseen that the states, by
different regulations with regard to the above recited instances, might
obstruct that uniformity, and occasion great inconveniences.”75
69. Remarker ad Corrigendum, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [2], at 738 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter VOL. 5: MASSACHUSETTS 2]; see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 54
(explaining that the Elections Clause “might also be useful . . . lest a few powerful states should
combine, and make regulations concerning elections which might deprive many of the fair exercise
of their rights, and thus injure the community, and occasion great dissatisfaction.”).
70. Caroliniensis, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, 1, Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted in 27 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: SOUTH CAROLINA 240 (John P. Kaminski et al eds., 2016)
[hereinafter VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA].
71. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 267–68 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(Jan. 21, 1788, Massachusetts Convention).
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id.
74. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 60 (statement of William R. Davie); VOL. 10: VIRGINIA
3, supra note 50, at 1259 (statement of James Madison).
75. ARATUS: TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, reprinted in 11 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete)

2021]

THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE

10/11/2021 4:05 PM

1013

Uniformity as to the time of elections, in particular, would ensure there
would always be a quorum in the House, including during periods of
emergency.76
Madison made his own arguments at the pivotal, contentious Virginia
ratifying convention, consistent with his statement at the Constitutional
Convention and the reasoning of his federalist colleagues in other states.
For days, Madison defended the Constitution against assault from Patrick
Henry, George Mason, and other prominent foes. Henry warned that the
Elections Clause could “totally destroy the end of suffrage” if Congress
sets the election at a place “the most inconvenient in the state” or far from
where voters live.77 James Monroe (who would soon face Madison in the
first congressional election) challenged the Clause. He asked why
regulation of congressional elections was under the “ultimate controul” of
the national legislature.78 At Charlottesville, Madison set out his view of
the broad purposes behind the Clause, beyond whether states held
elections at all. State regulation of congressional elections, he declared,
“should be uniform throughout the Continent. Some states might regulate
the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them
otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust.”79 Critiquing South
Carolina’s malapportionment,80 he added, “[s]hould the people of any
State, by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged
proper that it should be remedied by the General Government.”81
Antifederalists waged repeated attacks. The Elections Clause, they
argued, granted Congress too much power. One Massachusetts delegate
remarked that the Clause would “make Congress omnipotent.”82 A North
Carolina delegate called the provision “reprehensible” and predicted that
it could cause “state legislatures [to] entirely decay away.”83 In Virginia,
Patrick Henry claimed that the control “given to Congress over the time,
place, and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the end of
suffrage.”84 And the dissenting minority in Pennsylvania warned that
STATES: MARYLAND [1], at 38 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015) (emphasis in original)
(thought to be authored by George Lux).
76. THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION: DEBATES (JUNE 4, 1788), reprinted in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA [2], at 920–21 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990)
[hereinafter VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2] (statement of George Nicholas).
77. Id. at 964.
78. VOL. 10: VIRGINIA 3, supra note 50, at 1259.
79. Id. at 1260.
80. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 242.
81. Id.
82. VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1398–99.
83. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 50–51.
84. VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2, supra note 76, at 964–65.
BY THE
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when the spirit of the people shall be gradually broken; when the
general government shall be firmly established, and when a
numerous standing army shall render opposition vain, the
Congress may complete the system of despotism, in renouncing
all dependence on the people, by continuing themselves, and
[their] children in the government.85
Opponents warned that members of Congress could entrench themselves
by situating polling places at inconvenient locations,86 and they advanced
similar arguments in published essays and private letters.87 One opponent,
John Steele in North Carolina, addressed these concerns by highlighting
the newly powerful federal judiciary; if Congress enacted Elections
Clause legislation that was “inconsistent with the Constitution,
independent judges will not uphold them[.]”88 Many proposed that
85. THE DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION (DEC. 18, 1787), reprinted in VOL. 2:
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 629–30.
86. See, e.g., THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLS A STATE CONVENTION (JAN. 19,
1788), reprinted in VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 70, at 167 (statement of Charles
Pinckney); VOL. 10: VIRGINIA 3, supra note 50, at 1290–91 (June 14, 1788) (denoting George
Mason’s concerns that Congress could establish polling place at inconvenient locations); VOL. 6:
MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1409 (Feb. 2, 1788) (undelivered speech by Timothy Winn);
see also VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 510 (Dec. 6, 1787); 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 30–32 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at
70.
87. See An Officer of the Late Continental Army, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787,
reprinted in VOL. 2: PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 56, at 210; Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard &
Samuel Field, Dissent to the Massachusetts Convention, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Apr. 16, 1788, at 9,
reprinted in 7 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS [4], at 1734–
35 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2001); Samuel, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in VOL. 5:
MASSACHUSETTS 2, supra note 69, at 680 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998); Brutus, VA. INDEP.
CHRON., May 14, 1788, reprinted in VOL. 9: VIRGINIA 2, supra note 76, at 802; A Farmer and Planter,
MD. J., Apr. 1, 1788, reprinted in 12 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES:
MARYLAND [2], at 467 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2015); Letter from John Brown Cutting to
William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION [2], at 479 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 2009).
88. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 71; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964).
Judicial review was not foreign to the Framers, even if finding legislation unconstitutional was
atypical. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887, 891, 927–82 (2003) (noting that “there is a wealth of evidence that the Founders believed
that the courts could exercise some form of judicial review over federal statutes” and presenting such
evidence, including review of state statutes); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review
Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 798
(1999) (“[F]or many Americans in the 1790s judicial review of some sort did exist. But it remained
an extraordinary and solemn political action . . . .”). In the years before Marbury v. Madison, judicial
review particularly reflected distrust of state lawmakers, as “exercises of judicial review served to
keep state legislatures, rather than Congress, in check.” William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 (2005). Notably, in a case shortly after ratification in
which a circuit court struck down a state statute (unrelated to elections), the court made the case for
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Congress’s power to regulate should only be triggered by a state’s
complete failure to enact federal election regulations.89 Generally, they
assumed that would require a rewrite of the Clause. The Pennsylvania
antifederalist Samuel Bryan (or his father, George) suggested that the
language of the Clause already limited Congress’s authority to apply only
in cases of state default,90 and John Jay of New York seemed to have
understood the Clause in the same manner.91 But that interpretation was
belied by the fact that, upon ratifying the Constitution, nearly half of all
states proposed amendments to limit Congress’s power to occasions of
state default or, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, if states acted in a
way that was “subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal
representation in Congress.”92 Ultimately, however, those amendment
efforts failed.
2.

Federalist Papers

During the state debates, Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and
John Jay, made the case for ratifying the new Constitution in the Federalist
Papers. In Federalist Papers Nos. 59, 60, and 61, published in late
February 1788, Hamilton addressed “the Power of Congress to Regulate
judicial review by arguing that state lawmakers “surely” could not make election laws that
contravened a state’s constitution. VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 309 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1795) (“Could the Legislature have annulled these articles, respecting . . . elections by ballot?
Surely no. As to these points there was no devolution of power; the authority was purposely withheld,
and reserved by the people to themselves. . . . The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not
to be worked upon by the temper of the times . . . ”). But see Rucho v. Common Cause, __ U.S. __,
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and
considered what to do about them. . . . At no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had
a role to play. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts doing such a
thing.”).
89. See VOL. 6: MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1213–22; 26 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: RHODE ISLAND [3], at 920–21 [hereinafter VOL. 26: RHODE ISLAND]
(debates of Mar. 3, 1790); 23 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: NEW YORK [5],
at 2206 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) (debates of July 17, 1788); Letter from David Ramsay to
Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 1787), reprinted in VOL. 27: SOUTH CAROLINA, at 38 (John P. Kaminski et
al. eds., 2009).
90. See, e.g., Centinel I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in VOL. 2:
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 60, at 163–64 (“The plain construction of [Art. I, Sec. 4] is, that when
the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation of this government, then Congress
are to provide for the election and appointment of Representatives and Senators.”) (quoting who is
thought to be Samuel Bryan)
91. VOL. 22: NEW YORK 4, supra note 56, at 1905 (June 25, 1788).
92. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 322, 325–26, 329–30 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836); see also 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 57, at 246; VOL. 26: RHODE ISLAND, supra note 89, at 999–1000 (Rhode Island
Form of Ratification and Amendments); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 545 (meeting at
Harrisburg, after Pennsylvania had ratified the Constitution).
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the Election of Members”93 and rebutted objections to that power.94 These
articles are illuminating, though they are somewhat misleading in their
narrow focus on what to do if states fail to hold elections.
In Federalist No. 59, Hamilton was charged with defending the
congressional veto found in the Elections Clause. Hamilton affirmed that
Congress must have the authority to regulate the election of its own
members because “EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN
IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION.”95 Hamilton
made no attempt to disguise his distrust of state lawmakers:
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of
regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of
the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union
entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it,
by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer
its affairs.96
Hamilton also offered a rationale for why the Elections Clause uses
“words of great latitude.”97 No specific regulation “would have been
always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the
country.”98 Therefore, “a discretionary power over elections” was
preferable to a more specific provision that would later require a
constitutional amendment to change.99
In Federalist No. 60, Hamilton addressed fears that the Elections
Clause conferred on Congress the power to “promote the election of some
favorite class of men in exclusion of others.”100 Concerns that Congress
could effectively select its members by setting polling places at
inconvenient locations were “chimerical.”101 A “victorious and
overbearing majority” might, “in certain turbulent and factious seasons,”
violate the right to vote for “a particular class of citizens.”102 But Hamilton
was confident that such a manipulation by Congress—if it affected “the
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
94. Id. NOS. 59–61 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. Id. NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
96. Id. (“With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections
for the national government, a combination of a few such men . . . might accomplish the destruction
of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which
perhaps they may themselves have excited), to discontinue the choice of members for the federal
House of Representatives.”).
97. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 240–41; THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
99. Id.
100. Id. NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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great mass of the people”—would occasion a “popular revolution” led by
State governments.103 He dismissed the worry that Congress would favor,
say, landowners over merchants, because the House of Representatives
would be made up of diverse members with varying interests.104 Nor could
Congress regulate elections to accommodate the rich because “the
wealthy and the well-born” were not concentrated in particular locations,
but were instead “scattered over the face of the country as avarice or
chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their
predecessors.”105 The Constitution had avoided giving Congress the
power to restrict voting to property owners because the power granted by
the Elections Clause is “expressly restricted to the regulation of the
TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections.”106
In Federalist No. 61, Hamilton noted that states were more likely than
Congress to abuse their elections authority to favor a particular class of
electors.107 Congress could establish uniformity, particularly as to the time
of electing House members.108 And although uniformity would be most
easily achieved by a constitutional provision setting a date for federal
elections, Hamilton explained that “if a time had been appointed, it might,
upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other
time.”109 Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that Congress’s flexible time
power would facilitate uniformity as to the time of elections, enabling the
House to assemble at a particular period each year and allowing citizens
to vote out the entirety of the House at one time, if an “improper spirit”
prevailed on all its members.110
II.

EARLY CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
ELECTIONS CLAUSE

A.

The First Fifty Years

In the first five decades after the ratification of the Constitution,
Congress enacted no legislation pursuant to its authority under the
Elections Clause. However, Congress was far from silent. In debates
about proposed constitutional amendments and contested House

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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elections, lawmakers consistently embraced broad conclusions about the
Clause’s meaning, recognizing that it empowered Congress to supersede
state provisions for congressional elections, even if states had not
defaulted on their duty to hold such elections.
1.

The First Congress (1789)

The original public meaning of the Clause—that it gave Congress
sweeping power and aimed to curb abuse by state lawmakers—was
evident in congressional debates held just a few months after ratification.
In 1789, the First Congress rejected a constitutional amendment that
would have let Congress “alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places,
or manner” of congressional elections only “when any State shall refuse
or neglect, or be unable, by invasion or rebellion, to make such
election.”111 Introduced by antifederalist Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina as the House considered what became the Bill of Rights, the
proposal instigated debate that mirrored the ratification debates. As Fisher
Ames, Chair of the House Committee on Elections, stressed, “such an
amendment as was now proposed would alter the Constitution: it would
vest the supreme authority in places where it was never contemplated.”112
“[T]he constitution,” Madison maintained, “stands very well as it is.”113
By denouncing the constitutional status quo, the amendment’s
antifederalist proponents confirmed that the Elections Clause conferred
unilateral, plenary power upon Congress – going beyond whether states
held elections at all. Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) condemned the provision as
granting Congress unchecked authority over its own elections—the power
of “controlling the elections of the people.”114 The Elections Clause, he
warned, enabled Congress to “abolish the mode of balloting,” require that
“every person must publicly announce his vote,” or move the polls to
“remote places.”115 Notably, none of the critics contested that Congress
could revise state laws for congressional elections as it saw fit or that
“manner” conveyed comprehensive control, including over balloting and
111. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 797–802 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
112. Id. at 800.
113. Id. at 798.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 797–98. Michael Stone of Maryland endorsed the amendment on the ground that the
federal government should not have “the power of determining on the mode of their own election.”
Id. at 798. Thomas Tucker of South Carolina lamented that the Elections Clause granted Congress the
power to decide for itself whether and how states should district for House elections. “It had been
supposed by some States, that electing by districts was the most convenient mode of choosing
members to this House; others have thought that the whole State ought to vote for the whole number
of members to be elected for that State,” Tucker observed. “Congress might, under like impressions,
set their regulations aside.” Id. at 801.
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districting.116
Madison, Sherman, and others did not dispute critics’ claim of
sweeping congressional power. Rather, they argued those powers were
integral to the Constitution’s design. “The Convention were very
unanimous in passing this clause,” Sherman insisted, noting that “it was
an important provision, and if it was resigned it would tend to subvert the
Government.”117 Madison warned that limiting congressional power over
elections would “destroy the principles and the efficacy of the
Constitution.”118 The purpose was broad: “as much injury might result to
the Union from improper regulations, as from a neglect or refusal to many
any” and “inadequate regulations were equally injurious as having
none.”119 In this spirit, Theodore Sedgwick (later Speaker of the House)
proposed a compromise amendment that would have let Congress “alter
the times, manner, and places of holding elections, provided the States
made improper ones.”120 Ames argued that the elections power was “one
of the most justifiable of all the powers of Congress” because “it was
essential to a body representing the whole community, that they should
have power to regulate their own elections, in order to secure a
representation from every part, and prevent any improper regulations,
calculated to answer party purposes only.”121
2.

Rejected Constitutional Amendments (1801 and 1823)

In the coming decades, Congress would twice more reject proposed
amendments that sought to change the Elections Clause. Its decision
confirmed the founding-era view that the clause confers upon Congress
discretionary, plenary, and superseding authority over congressional
elections.
In 1801, Congress set aside a proposal to amend the Constitution to
require that House members be elected from single-member districts in
each state “in the manner which the Legislature thereof shall prescribe.”122
The House Committee on Elections concluded that the amendment would
be “superfluous and inconvenient” because requiring single-member
districts was “already within the limits of the legislative authority of the
Government of the United States . . . , to which recurrence may be had at
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 797–802.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id. (statements of Reps. Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.) and Fisher Ames (Mass.)).
Id.
Id. at 797.
6 ANNALS OF CONG. 785 (1801).
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all times . . . as the public good or convenience may require.”123 Further,
the Committee worried that adopting the amendment would “indirectly
tend to withdraw from the Government of the United States its existing
control” over House elections by reassigning control of their “manner” to
the States.124
In 1823, Congress rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that
similarly would have required uniform House elections by single-member
districts.125 A special committee urged the House to reduce both
congressional and state legislative power over federal elections because
that power was so vast that factions at either level could wield it to
entrench themselves or their partisans.126 The Elections Clause, the
committee recognized, granted Congress “controlling and superseding
power” over its own elections.127 With that power, Congress could decide
whether to hold elections by districts or by “general-ticket” (i.e., at-large,
statewide winner-take-all voting) and how to draw the district lines.128
Congress could even treat some states differently from others.129 The
special committee found these powers to be “exceedingly dangerous”
because Congress could create “an artificial arrangement of districts” such
that a “small minority of the people would elect a majority of the national
representatives.”130
Yet the committee equally feared the power the Elections Clause
granted the states. The Clause, it was argued, permitted “the very
foundations of the two most important branches of this Government . . . to
fluctuate with the mutable counsels of twenty-four separate
Legislatures.”131 This “Constitutional laxity” undermined the “stability of
the law,” which should have been an “indispensable safeguard.”132
“[T]emporary factions” might seize state legislatures and use their
Elections Clause power to entrench themselves or their allies.133 The
“existing system” was actually “without system” and should be remedied
to prevent majorities from adopting measures that would “deprive the

123.
1834).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 218 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds.,
Id. at 218–19.
41 ANNALS OF CONG. 850–66 (1823).
Id. at 850–53.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id. at 852–53
Id. at 852.
Id.
Id.
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minority of their just rights,” which was “one of the primary objects of a
written Constitution.”134
Notwithstanding these concerns, Congress rejected the proposed
amendments and left the body’s vast powers as it found them.
3.

Contested Elections (1789–1841)

Though Congress did not legislate pursuant to the Elections Clause
during its first fifty years, contested House elections gave lawmakers
occasion to reflect on the scope of their election powers.
For example, in 1804, after Representative William Hoge vacated his
congressional seat, his brother John Hoge was sent to Congress in a
special election held at the direction of Pennsylvania’s governor.135
Pennsylvania lacked legislation pertaining to special elections in the event
of a vacancy. The scenario presented Congress with occasion to consider
how the Elections Clause interacts with Article I, Section 2, Clause 4,
which directs the state executive to issue a writ of elections to fill a
congressional vacancy.136 Representative William Findley (Pa.), who
chaired the Committee of Elections, acknowledged that Congress could
regulate the times, place, and manner of holding an election for
congressional vacancy, even if that election was ultimately called by the
governor.137 John Lucas, also of Pennsylvania, noted that state lawmakers
were vested with the power to regulate elections, but added that this is “a
subject of such importance that Congress is empowered to control the
State Legislatures in that very case.”138 Three years later, when the House
seated a member even though his election defied a state statute requiring
that he reside in one subsection of his district, the House reasserted this
power. “The Federal Constitution indeed provisionally delegates to the
State Legislature the authority of directing the time, place, and manner of
holding elections at the discretion of Congress,” Findley explained.139
Although Findley thought that Congress should not exercise its Elections
Clause power except to check “abuses or usurpations of power by the
States,” he readily conceded that the national legislature “may do [so] at
discretion.”140 Similar endorsements of Congress’s supreme,
134. Id.
135. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 838 (1804).
136. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 provides: “When vacancies happen in the Representation from
any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4.
137. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 842–44 (1804).
138. Id. at 852.
139. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1807) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
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discretionary power permeate the record of contested House elections
throughout these decades.141
Congressional debates in this era reflected not only the supremacy of
Congress’s elections power, but also the variety of legitimate interests that
the Elections Clause countenanced. At a minimum, Congress could
legislate in order to preserve its existence.142 Others recognized additional
interests, particularly uniformity and the protection of the right of
qualified electors to vote in congressional elections.143 Congress’s power
to regulate the “manner” of elections included regulation of balloting,
counting, election administration, and districting. For example, one
representative noted without dispute that the term encompassed whether
“the election may be viva voce, by ballot, by districts for the convenience
of the voters, or by the States in a general ticket.”144 In 1834, Aaron
Vanderpoel, a New York Representative and member of the House
Committee on Elections, explained that the “manner” of holding elections
included “the means, the judges, the instruments, by which the election is
to be carried into effect,” along with “the sheriff of the county, and a clerk
and two judges, appointed by the county court at their term next preceding
the election.”145 These collectively formed “[t]he conduits through which
the will of the voter is to flow . . . .”146 Nevertheless, some legislators
pointed to the limits of the “manner” authority, noting that the
qualifications of voters and representatives went beyond such power.147

141. See, e.g., 10 CONG. DEB. 4303 (1834) (statement of Rep. Patrick H. Pope, Ky.) (“[T]he right
to vote for members of this House is derived, not from the constitution of Kentucky, but from the
constitution of the United States. . . . [T]hat instrument gives to the Legislature, and not to the
constitution, or those who framed it, the right to prescribe the time, place, and manner of voting . . . so
long as the Congress shall permit it.”) (emphasis added); 14 CONG. DEB. 1186–87 (1837) (statement
of Rep. Hugh S. Legaré, S.C.) (Congress “controlled absolutely the whole subject of congressional
elections, with the single exception of the place of electing Senators”).
142. See CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 68 (1838) (statement of Rep. Charles Eaton
Haynes, Ga.); CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 12–13 (1840) (statement of Rep. Robert
Rhett, S.C.).
143. See CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 91–92 (1837) (statement of Rep. George W.
Towns, Ga.).
144. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 912–13 (1807) (statement of Rep. Philip B. Key, Md.); see also 14
CONG. DEB. 1187 (1837) (statement of Rep. Hugh S. Legaré, S.C.) (noting that when discussing an
1837 election dispute, another representative offered a nonexhaustive list of Congress’s “manner”
authority, which included the power to “pass uniform laws requiring all elections to be by ballot or
viva voce—all to be by general ticket or by district—all to be at the same season of the year, &c.”).
145. 10 CONG. DEB. 4286–87 (1834).
146. Id. at 4287.
147. See, e.g., 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807) (statement of Rep. Josiah Quincy, Mass.)
(explaining that Congress had exclusive power to establish the qualifications of its members through
the Qualifications Clause, Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, and that states were not granted such power
by the Elections Clause); 10 CONG. DEB. 4303 (1834) (statement of Rep. Patrick H. Pope, Ky.).
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The Apportionment Act of 1842 and its Aftermath

In its first exercise of its power under the Elections Clause, Congress
enacted an Apportionment Act in 1842,148 requiring that House members
be elected from contiguous single-member districts.149 The Act also
reduced the size of the House of Representatives by increasing the ratio
of persons per representative.150 The fact that Congress had never before
enacted any Elections Clause legislation loomed over the debate.151 With
a slight Whig majority in the Twenty-Seventh Congress, it passed the
House by just two votes, along mostly partisan lines.152
Coming a half-century after the ratification of the Constitution, it was
also a chance for the young nation to reflect on the original intent of the
document. Madison’s Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention
were first published in 1840, and Elliot’s Debates—a compilation from
the state ratifying conventions—came out between 1827 to 1830.153
Members had a novel opportunity to ground their arguments in the
Framers’ original intent. As one scholar has noted, “perhaps the most
striking feature of the debate was the backward-looking tone and structure
of the argument.”154
At the time, ten states used at large voting for House elections. Since
the first Congress, in fact, nearly one-third of members had been elected
that way.155 This magnified the power of small states, which for decades
successfully resisted a requirement for districts.156 Whigs believed the
districting legislation would help preserve their new majority and were
angered by Alabama’s switch to an at-large ticket in 1840, which deprived
the state of Whig representation.157 But partisanship was not the only
148. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 316 (1842) (statement of Rep. Andrew
Kennedy, D-Ind.) (“[H]ere is a proposition to commence the exercise of a power by this Government,
which, if it possess the power at all, it is admitted has never been exercised, but has lain dormant for
the entire period of our national existence.”); id. at 342 (statement of Rep. George S. Houston, DAla.).
152. Martin H. Quitt, Congressional (Partisan) Constitutionalism: The Apportionment Act Debates
of 1842 and 1844, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 627, 637 (2008).
153. Id. at 639–40.
154. Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the “Bear Garden”: Representation and the
Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 355, 372–73 (1985).
155. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1776–1850, at 129 (1987).
156. Id.
157. Shields, supra note 154, at 371; James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do
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factor at play. The politics of slavery also led Southerners (including
Southern Democrats) to support the Bill, because elections held by district
decreased the likelihood that northern districts would elect critics of
slavery.158 One South Carolina Democrat warned, “On all the questions
peculiar to Southern interests, the Northern States, owing to the district
system, were now divided,” but if “the general [system] prevail[ed], [the
Northern states] would overwhelm the South.”159 Reducing the size of the
House by increasing the ratio of persons to representatives also favored
the less populous Southern states.160
The Bill’s enactment (despite sharply polarized debate), the next
Congress’s decision not to repudiate it as unconstitutional, and successive
districting legislation confirmed that Congress understood it had the
power to regulate congressional elections and the drawing of districts.
1.

Elections Clause Issues Raised by the Apportionment Act

Controversy centered on the Apportionment Act’s second section,
which required single-member congressional districts: “[I]n every case
where a State is entitled to more than one Representative, the number to
which each State shall be entitled under this apportionment shall be
elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to
the number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one
district electing more than one Representative.”161 States would be barred
from holding at-large elections, or from electing multiple members from
the same district.
a.

Federalism

Some Apportionment Act opponents tried to resurrect a familiar
objection: Congress must defer to states unless they refuse or fail to act
themselves. “[I]t would be unconstitutional to exercise this power now,”
Representative John G. Floyd (D-NY) told the House, “because the
debates in the National Convention prove that it was only intended to be
an ultimate power, for self-preservation, in case the States neglected to
Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
357, 375 (2002).
158. James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 913 n.114 (2006);
ZAGARRI, supra note 155, at 140; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1842) (statement
of Rep. Garret Davis, W-Ky) (“The peculiar principles of the South, and every interest it cherished,
were to be protected by the district system.”).
159. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 445 (1842) (statement of Rep. John Campbell, D-S.C.).
160. Shields, supra note 154, at 371.
161. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491.
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exercise it.”162 The Senate heard similar arguments. “[I]t was only
intended that Congress should exercise it in case the States should make
insufficient regulations, or fail to make them altogether,” one opponent
insisted.163
The Act’s supporters countered that the text expressly empowered
Congress to “alter” state laws for congressional elections at any time.
“[W]hat plain, unsophisticated man, reading this clause, would for a
moment doubt the power of Congress to control the whole subject,
whenever, in its discretion, it shall see fit to do so? Could language be
more direct, full, and explicit?” asked Representative Sampson H. Butler
(D-S.C.).164 “Nor is it only in case of a neglect or failure, for any cause, to
perform this duty, that it then devolves upon Congress,” Representative
Daniel Barnard (W-N.Y.) argued. “To Congress, moreover, the power is
ultimate and appellate. If the States fail altogether, or if any one of them
fail, Congress must act. If the States act, Congress has a right to review,
and revise, and, if need be, correct and ‘alter’ the regulations which they
may adopt.”165 Others echoed this interpretation,166 and contested rival
claims about the Framers’ intent.167
Each side acknowledged that Congress could not order the states to
enact particular laws. “Congress may itself make the alterations,” one
lawmaker complained, “but may not, cannot, direct the Legislatures of the
States to make them.”168 Similar statements recurred throughout the
debates.169 Even the Bill’s advocates, such as Senator Nathanial P.
Tallmadge (W-N.Y.), conceded: “no one on this side of the question has
said anything about a mandamus or a mandate to the States. No one
pretends that Congress or this Government has any power to issue such a
162. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 322 (1842) (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 786; see also id. at 584; id. at 524 (statement of Sen. Samuel McRoberts, D-Ill.) (“[T]his
power was not to be exercised by Congress,” another asserted, “except when the Legislatures of any
State shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion, or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”) (emphasis
in original).
164. Id. at 319.
165. Id. at 380.
166. See, e.g., id. at 490 (statement of Sen. Jabez W. Huntington, W-Conn.); id. at 512 (statement
of Sen. Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, W-N.Y.); id. at 793 (statement of Sen. Isaac C. Bates, W-Mass.); id.
at 789 (statement of Sen. Jacob W. Miller, W-Mass.).
167. Id. at 380 (statement of Rep. Daniel D. Barnard, W-N.Y.); see also id. at 408 (statement of
Rep. Nathaniel G. Pendleton, W-Ohio); id. at 789 (statement of Sen. Jacob W. Miller, W-Mass.).
168. Id. at 467 (statement of Sen. Silas Wright, D-N.Y.) (emphasis in original).
169. See also id. at 360 (statement of Rep. William W. Payne, D-Ala.) (“I do deny that Congress
has power to command a State Legislature to district a State.”); id. at 449 (statement of Sen. James
Buchanan, D-Pa.) (“That no such command can be constitutionally issued, I consider to be a clear,
nay, an almost self-evident proposition.”); id. at 397 (statement of Rep. Charles G. Atherton, D-N.H.);
id. at 422 (statement of Sen. Leonard Wilcox, D-N.H.).
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mandate . . . Congress has no such power, and will not attempt to compel
the States.”170
The Act’s opponents saw partial election laws as a violation of what
would later be called the anti-commandeering principle.171 One senator
insisted: “If they are required to elect by districts, Congress must go on
and prescribe the boundaries of the districts.”172 Senator Silas Wright (DN.Y.), one of the bill’s most dedicated opponents, added that “The great
principle . . . was, that whatever regulations Congress should attempt to
make in this matter, should be so made that the people might be able to
act under them, without the intervention and aid of laws to be passed by
the State Legislatures.”173
The Act’s defenders insisted that Congress could exercise as much or
as little of its Elections Clause power as it saw fit. Any command to the
states came from the Constitution, not from Congress. “[T]he power of
Congress and the duty of the States, in relation to this subject, are
correlative,” Tallmadge explained.174 “Whenever Congress exercises its
power, the States must perform their duty . . . The extent to which
Congress will go in making or altering these regulations, whether in whole
or in part, is entirely within its own discretion.”175 Partial legislation left
the states free “to fill up the measure of legislation which the case
requires.”176 Senator Isaac C. Bates (W-Mass.) explained, “[t]here is not
only no command in [this bill], which seems so offensive to some
Senators; but there is nothing in the form of a command, nor in effect a
command.”177
With the enactment of the Apportionment Act, the understanding that
the Elections Clause allowed Congress to control some of the “manner”
of elections without having to control all of it prevailed.
b.

The Meaning of “Manner”

Although the precise scope of “manner” remained contested, the
Apportionment Act’s passage confirmed that Congress understood the
term to include a broad array of topics, including districting. Senator

170. Id. at 512.
171. Under the “anti-commandeering” doctrine, Congress cannot directly compel states or state
officials to enforce federal law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997).
172. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 524 (1842) (statement of Sen. McRoberts).
173. Id. at 469.
174. Id. at 512.
175. Id.; see also id. at 513; id. at 793 (statement of Sen. Bates).
176. Id. at 380 (statement of Rep. Barnard).
177. Id. at 793.
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Wright acknowledged that “manner” included “the manner of voting, the
manner of receiving, keeping, counting, and returning the votes, and the
districts of territory within which the freemen should meet and vote at the
same poll.”178 Representative William W. Payne (D-Ala.) argued that
“manner” meant
[n]othing more than that Congress might, by law, provide that the
electors should vote viva voce, or by ticket; that the United States
marshal, the sheriff of a county, commissioners of roads and
revenue, the county judge, or other officer appointed by Congress,
should open the polls, receive and count the votes, declare the
result, and issue the certificate of election,
before paradoxically adding, “&c. [et cetera], and nothing more.”179
Representative Walter Colquitt, a newly minted Democrat from Georgia,
construed districting as a de facto regulation of the qualifications of
representatives and voters, and argued this went beyond Congress’s
“manner” authority.180
Supporters offered similar lists, but often added districting. Tallmadge
explained that “[t]he manner includes the districts; the voting by ballot or
viva voce; the officers to conduct the election; the form of the ballot,
whether written or printed; the ballot boxes; the poll lists; the returns, and
all the incidents from the commencement to the close of an election.”181
In a sign of how hard it was to deny that “manner” included districting,
the Act’s opponents were divided about how (or even whether) to contest
that claim. Buchanan, who criticized the bill for commandeering state
legislatures, “freely admit[ted] the power of Congress to divide the States
into single congressional districts” as one “expressly given to them by the
terms of the Constitution itself.”182 Though he and opponents of the
Apportionment Act “might complain of such an act as an abuse of power,
we could never contend that it was a violation of the Constitution.”183 One
Representative told his colleagues that he could not justify his claim that
“manner” excluded districting.184 A smaller number of the Act’s critics

178. Id. at 469.
179. Id. at 361.
180. Id. at 447.
181. Id. at 513; see also id. at 492 (statement of Sen. Huntington) (“The ‘manner’ of holding
elections embraces several things: such, among others, as an election by districts or general ticket;
viva voce or by ballot; by a plurality or by a majority”).
182. Id. at 449.
183. Id. at 451.
184. Id. at 360 (“The weight of authority is against me,” he confessed, “but I am not lawyer enough
to have my thoughts trammeled by precedent, or my mind swayed by authority.”).
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offered more confident (if not more convincing) objections.185 But none
of these members won many colleagues to these positions.
The clear (and ultimately successful) majority of the Twenty-Seventh
Congress interpreted the “manner of holding elections” to include
districting.186 Like other supporters of the Act, Tallmadge emphasized the
original public meaning of the Elections Clause and the intent of the
Framers more generally. Congress’s power to direct that representatives
be elected by district was “fully and beyond all question,” Tallmadge
argued, because of
the contemporaneous exposition given by [the Framers] and those
associated with them, in the journal of the convention which
formed the Constitution—in the publications that enforced its
adoption—in the debates of the conventions of the States which
ratified it—and in the proceedings of the first Congress which
assembled under it.187
Representative Nathaniel G. Pendleton (W-Ohio) reasoned that if the
Elections Clause gave the states the power to elect their representatives
by single-member districts, so too must the Elections Clause give
Congress the same power.188
Supporters of the Apportionment Act also advanced the understanding
of the Elections Clause that would prevail by Reconstruction: that the
Clause conferred plenary power over congressional elections except as to
the matters the Constitution seemed to expressly preclude (e.g., the site of
elections to the Senate and the qualifications of voters and candidates).189
Affirmations that the phrase “times, places, and manner of holding
elections” confers plenary power appear throughout these debates.190

185. Senator Arthur P. Bagby (D-Ala.) claimed that the Constitution required at-large
congressional elections, arguing that single-member districts denied each voter the right to vote for
all of his state’s House members. Id. at 786. Representative Andrew Kennedy (D-Ind.) suggested that
the “manner of holding the elections” meant “prescribing the mode in which the voter shall exercise
the right of suffrage,” a definition he thought denied Congress the power to “break into our territorial
limits, and there ‘gerrymander’ our States.” Id. at 317.
186. See, e.g., id. at 512 (statement of Sen. Tallmadge) (“Congress has the power to direct that
Representatives to the other House be elected by single districts.”).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 408.
189. Id. at 512 (statement of Sen. Tallmadge) (arguing the Elections Clause “includes every thing
necessary to ascertain, under our system of Republican Government, the popular will in regard to
those who shall represent them.”).
190. See, e.g., id. at 789 (statement of Sen. Miller) (“The exercise of the power by Congress . . . is
a primary overruling power, embracing the whole subject.”); id. at 490 (statement of Sen. Huntington)
(Congress’s power “[i]s ample, full, and plenary; and, so far as it is exercised, it is supreme, overriding
State legislation, and is the paramount law, to be obeyed and enforced.”); id. at 319 (statement of Rep.
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Representatives read the constitutional and ratification conventions,
together with the history of rejected constitutional amendments, to
confirm their claims. For example, Senator Jabez Huntington explained:
The foregoing views are sustained by the opinions expressed in
the National and State conventions, by all who spoke on the
subject, and by the resolutions of several of the State conventions,
which admitted that full power was given, but expressed an ardent
desire that the Constitution might be so amended as that this
power should not be exercised except in cases of necessity. All
the debates and proceedings connected with this subject show the
entire concurrence of all the friends and all the opponents of the
Constitution in the opinion that the power of Congress was entire
and supreme.191
Pendleton explained that “General Hamilton . . . had no such doubts”
about whether “the words ‘manner of holding’ . . . can be made to extend
to the question whether the elections shall be by districts or by general
ticket.” Indeed, Hamilton “treated the authority of the Legislature,
whether National or State, as covering the whole ground, embracing all
the regulations necessary to the consummation of an election, except such
as are established by the Constitution.”192
c.

Legitimate Congressional Interests

Debate on the 1842 Apportionment Act also addressed the ends to
which Congress could legitimately exercise its Elections Clause power.
i.

Self-Preservation

The least controversial interest that Congress could advance under the
Elections Clause was one familiar from the Framing: ensuring that
congressional elections would take place. As “a legal and moral person,”
Congress necessarily had the power “of continuing and perpetuating its
own existence, by the due election and perpetuation of these officers,” one
representative explained.193 Opponents of the Act went further, arguing
that self-preservation was the only permissible basis for the exercise of
this federal power. “The power to prescribe the ‘times, places, and
manner’ of electing Senators and Representatives, was conferred on this
Butler) (“Now, sir, what plain, unsophisticated man, reading this clause, would for a moment doubt
the power of Congress to control the whole subject . . .? Could language be more direct, full, and
explicit?”).
191. Id. at 491.
192. Id. at 407–08.
193. Id. at 379 (statement of Rep. Barnard).
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Government for the sole purpose of enabling it to preserve its own
existence, provided the States should fail or refuse to elect
Representatives, and for no other,” Representative Payne asserted in
typical remarks.194 Over the course of the debate, most of the Act’s critics
raised some version of this point.195
Some of the Act’s advocates replied that even if the Framers had
adopted the Elections Clause to enable Congress to protect itself, the
Framers had nevertheless written a sweeping grant of general power over
congressional elections that should be interpreted broadly. For example,
in response to a critic arguing Congress could not exercise its Elections
Clause power “until it is indispensable to prevent a dissolution of the
Government,” Pendleton took a “much larger and more liberal, and [he]
believe[d] more accurate, view of what the Convention intended by the
preservation of the Government.”196 Pendleton argued that the Elections
Clause must be understood broadly to ensure “the purity of popular
representation in this House, according to the true principles of the
Constitution[.]”197 He urged the embrace of substance over form.
Preservation of the federal government would be meaningless if “the
show, the appearance, the form of our Government” was maintained “but
the spirit and life are gone” because “the Government is almost as much
dissolved by a vicious representation as by no representation.”198 Senator
Bates likewise encouraged his chamber to take a broad view of the
permissible purposes of the Elections Clause power, arguing that “a
particular inducement to a grant is not a limitation upon the grant.”199
ii.

Uniformity and Equality

Representatives also acknowledged that Congress could exercise its
Elections Clause power to ensure uniformity and equality among districts.
According to Representative Barnard, “[t]he power conferred on
Congress by the Constitution, on the subject of the elections, was designed
to be exercised in either of two events”: if the states did not provide for
congressional elections or “if these regulations in the different States
should be such as to produce a want of uniformity and an inequality in the

194. Id. at 361.
195. See id. at 397 (statement of Rep. Atherton); id. at 465 (statement of Sen. Wright); id. at 786
(statement of Sen. Bagby); id. at 450–51 (statement of Sen. Buchanan); id. at 322 (statement of Rep.
Floyd).
196. Id. at 407.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 793.
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representation on this floor.”200 Many others agreed.201 As Senator
Huntington explained, Congress could require that its members be elected
by district because it would ensure “the right of the people to a free, equal,
and just representation in the Legislature” and it would “establish a system
uniform, practicable, just, [and] equal—giving to every portion of the
people its fair and legitimate political influence.”202 Huntington added that
such a system would ensure the representativeness of the body by
“send[ing] up to the House of Representatives men identified in feeling
and interest with those whom they represent.”203 Even some opponents
embraced the principle of equal representation. Buchanan, for example,
called it “the beau ideal of a system of representation.”204 Buchanan
acknowledged that “[a]s the people of the respective congressional
districts enjoy equal rights, their Representatives ought to meet and
deliberate on terms of perfect equality; and they ought individually to be
subjected to an equal responsibility to those by whom they were
elected.”205 And chief foe Senator Wright conceded that Congress had the
power to “alter” state election regulations:
[b]ecause the Legislature of a State, from disaffected feeling, or
other cause, might make regulations subversive of the principle,
of fair and equal representation, impracticable as to time,
unreasonable as to place, odious as to manner, or otherwise
subversive of those popular rights intended to be secured by the
Constitution—and by this provision, as a most essential part of
it.206
iii.

Protecting Political Minorities

Protecting political (i.e., partisan) minorities emerged as an important
congressional interest during these debates. One refrain of advocates for
single-member districting was that at-large elections denied political
minorities proportional (or, sometimes, any) representation. This denial
200. Id. at 381.
201. See id. at 491 (Sen. Huntington, arguing that one aim of the Elections Clause was “to produce
uniformity in the manner of holding elections, so far as Congress should deem it proper to have the
manner uniform”); id. at 788 (statement of Sen. Miller); id. at 792 (statement of Sen. Bates). Only in
the years after this debate would Congress enact legislation to enable uniform administration of
federal elections. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (1845) (uniform presidential
election day); Act of Feb. 19, 1851, ch. 11, 9 Stat. 568 (1851) (uniform process for resolving contested
House elections).
202. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 493 (1842).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 439.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 465.
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of due representation, they contended, amounted to the
disenfranchisement of political minorities and the entrenchment of
majorities. The Elections Clause gave Congress the power to right that
wrong.
Many in Congress were confident that political minorities had rights
that Congress had the duty and power to secure. “It needs no argument to
prove the importance of minorities to the preservation of public liberty,
and the equitable administration of Government,” Huntington said. “They
have rights too, which ought to be protected.”207 Chief among these was
the right to vote and be represented. “If the general-ticket system be
adopted, that political party which is in a minority, however near it may
approximate to an equality in numbers, will virtually be disfranchised,”
Senator Huntington elaborated, “and a free and equal representation of the
people be prevented.”208 Senator Bates echoed that concern. “The generalticket system disfranchises the minority in a State,” he declared, and “may
be used by the majority to perpetuate their power.”209 “[M]inorities, as
well as majorities, shall be represented in the Legislature,” another
explained. “Majorities certainly must govern, but minorities must be
heard.”210 For many members, single-member districting seemed likely to
mitigate, if not eliminate, the threat of the tyranny of the majority.211
In response, the Act’s opponents waved off concerns about such a
threat and defended a narrower conception of the right to vote as the right
(of qualified voters) to cast a ballot and have it counted. Senator Leonard
Wilcox (D-N.H.), for example, predicted that House of “nearly or mainly
of the same party character” was not “an event to be apprehended or
expected” because “[i]f it should ever exist, it would break down the party
by its own cumbrous weight.”212 Senator Bagby argued that denying
political minorities representation did not deny the right to vote at all:
“While the right to vote according to the dictates of conscience and
judgment remains unfettered and uncontrolled, no man is disfranchised. It
is said, however, that it is destructive of the rights of minorities. Beyond
the ballot-box minorities have no rights.”213 In enacting the
Apportionment Act, Congress repudiated this claim that merely casting a
ballot is all that the right to vote guarantees.
207. Id. at 493.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 793–94.
210. Id. at 409 (statement of Rep. Pendleton).
211. See id. at 493 (statement of Sen. Huntington); id. at 391 (statement of Sen. John J. Crittenden,
Ky.); id. at 320 (statement of Rep. Butler).
212. Id. at 424.
213. Id. at 584.
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Preventing Partisan Manipulation

Finally, and intertwined with the protection of political minorities, the
Apportionment Act debate reflected that Congress understood the
Elections Clause to enable it to combat partisan manipulation of election
law—especially gerrymandering. State power to regulate federal
elections, one member observed, led to “a violent struggle for the
ascendancy in the State Legislatures, growing out of the knowledge that
this power may, and the apprehension that it will, be abused.”214 Partisan
conflict, in turn, would lead to the reality (or at least the appearance) that
the minority “had in some way been defrauded of their electoral rights.”215
“The mode of forming districts, which has received the name of
gerrymandering . . . which is alike subversive of popular rights and of the
spirit of the Constitution,” was one particularly threatening means by
which partisan interests could suppress minority representation.216
Through the Elections Clause, Congress could decide for itself how its
elections would proceed, reducing the stakes of state political strife and
ensuring that “[a]ll attempts to arrange districts for political, party, or
selfish purposes, would be in vain, and the people would be secure in their
right to be represented in Congress.”217
2.

Enactment and Aftermath

The first complete draft of the Apportionment Act passed the House
with the single-member districting requirement by a vote of 113–87.218
The House passed the final version of the Bill, embracing two Senate
amendments to the apportionment ratio, by votes of 113–103 and 111–
102.219 The Senate passed the final Bill by a vote of 25–19.220
In the years after the enactment of the Apportionment Act of 1842,
debate about whether the Elections Clause permitted Congress to control
congressional districting slowly abated. By the close of Reconstruction,
Congress had enacted two similar districting laws with almost no debate.
In the first congressional elections under the Apportionment Act of
1842, four states defied the statute and elected their representatives at214. Id. at 407 (statement of Rep. Pendleton).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 493 (statement of Sen. Huntington); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 556 (1842)
(statement of Sen. Wright) (denouncing the “vice” of gerrymandering, which he predicted would be
the result of districting under the Apportionment Act).
217. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 493 (1842) (statement of Sen. Huntington).
218. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 471 (1842).
219. Id. at 649.
220. Id. at 614.
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large.221 The outgoing House Committee on Elections recommended a bill
suspending single-member districting for the upcoming Congress, but it
was not adopted.222
When the Twenty-Eighth Congress convened, Democrats had ousted
the Whig majority. The majority report of the new Congress’s committee
on the dispute recommended declaring the single-member districting
provision unconstitutional on anti-commandeering grounds. Because the
Act could not “execute itself without the intervention of the State
legislatures” (i.e., unless states drew maps), Congress had commandeered
the states.223 The report did make a significant concession, however,
acknowledging that Congress could intervene to protect political rights
against state laws that threatened them. “If the legislatures of the States
fail or refuse to act in the premises or act in such a manner as will be
subversive of the rights of the people and the principles of the
Constitution,” the report concluded, “then this conservative power
interposes, and, upon the principle of self-preservation, authorizes
Congress to do that which the State legislatures ought to have done.”224
The minority report repeated the constitutional claims that the Act’s
original supporters had advanced, and concluded that the state laws
providing for at-large elections were void because Congress had acted
lawfully in passing the Apportionment Act.225
After relitigating the constitutional questions discussed in 1842,226
Congress voted to seat the disputed representatives-elect,227 but also voted
down a resolution declaring the 1842 law unconstitutional.228 This
seemingly contradictory position likely reflected politics more than a
particular view on the Elections Clause. As Franita Tolson, authoritative
scholar on the Elections Clause and federalism, notes:
Arguably, the Democrats wanted to impose principled limitations
on the exercise of federal power to protect the slaveholding states,
which had been concerned about any broad interpretation of
federal power, while simultaneously taking advantage of their

221. See CHESTER H. ROWELL, A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DIGEST OF ALL THE CONTESTED
ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE FIRST TO
THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789-1901, at 117–20 (1901).
222. See id. at 117 n.1; H.R. 649, 27th Cong. (3d Sess. 1843).
223. See ROWELL, supra note 221, at 119.
224. See id. at 118; see also Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 352.
225. See ROWELL, supra note 221, at 120.
226. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 248–77 (1844).
227. Id. at 278.
228. Id. (voting 127 to 57 to substitute a resolution seating the disputed representatives in lieu of
one that would have declared the Act unconstitutional).
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majority status by reaffirming the more expansive interpretation
of federal authority embraced by the Whigs through the 1842
Act.229
Subsequent congresses embraced the interpretation of the Elections
Clause that the Twenty-Seventh Congress had put forward (and rejected
the narrower view of the Twenty-Eighth Congress). In 1862, Congress
enacted an Apportionment Act substantially similar to the 1842 statute,
again requiring that House members be elected from contiguous singlemember districts.230 Debate was desultory.231 In the Apportionment Act of
1872, Congress again required contiguous single-member districts, and
further required that each district “contain[] as nearly as practicable an
equal number of inhabitants.”232
C.

Reconstruction, 1865–1877

During Reconstruction, congressional activity under the Elections
Clause centered on two issues. Between 1865 and the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, Congress debated whether the Elections
Clause granted it the power to extend the right to vote to more people—
namely, Black men. Then, having enacted the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress enacted three bills to protect the right to vote—constructing the
first comprehensive system of federal election administration and
enforcement. The three Enforcement Acts drew on the constitutional
authority of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but they also
relied on the Elections Clause. By the close of this period, Congress
cemented the understanding that—with the exceptions of voter
qualifications and the place of choosing Senators—the national legislature
could exercise plenary power over its own elections.
1.

Congressional Power to Expand the Franchise, 1865–69

Between 1865 and 1869, Congress debated drafts of what became the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. That debate is as revealing for
what Congress assumed as for what it rejected. Most notably, although a

229. Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 349.
230. Apportionment Act, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572 (1862).
231. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3117–18 (1862) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull,
R-Ill.) (“This bill reenacts [the 1842 Act], and makes it a permanent law.”); id. (statement of Sen.
Daniel Clark, R-N.H.) (“After the passage of the old law requiring members to be elected by single
districts, the State of New Hampshire refused to comply with the law, and elected all her members by
general ticket, and they were all admitted by the House of Representatives. I thought the precedent
wrong at the time.”).
232. Apportionment Act, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28 (1872).
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few prominent members of each house contended that the Elections
Clause granted Congress the power to specify the qualifications of federal
voters, i.e., who was eligible to vote, Congress largely declined to act on
that theory.
Congress began to consider this question even before the Civil War had
ended. In 1865, New York’s legislature formally requested that the Senate
adopt
a law making uniform regulation throughout the United States of
the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators
and Representatives, except as to the place of choosing Senators,
defining the qualifications requisite for electors, and abrogating
such regulations prescribed by the Legislatures in each State or
otherwise as may be inconsistent therewith . . . .233
The Senate referred the request to the Committee on the Judiciary,234
which later decided not to act.235
Debate on federal legislation to expand the franchise—primarily to
prohibit denial of the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude—unfolded in earnest after the war concluded. In an
1866 debate about a bill to prohibit denial of the right to vote “on account
of color,” Representative William D. Kelley (R-Penn.) advanced what
appears to be the first postwar congressional argument that the Elections
Clause (read in conjunction with the Guarantee Clause) granted Congress
the power to decide who could vote:
[The Framers] made it the duty of the United States Government
to guaranty to each State a republican form of Government, and
having done that they did not fail to provide the means by which
the Government on which they had laid that duty should be able
to perform it. And they gave Congress the amplest power to
execute that section . . . in section four, article one . . . . Now, sir,
what did they mean by that provision? . . . Mr. Madison
said . . . “Should the people of any State by any means be deprived
of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be
remedied by the General Government.”236
Remarking on the injustice of denying the right to vote to the “educated,
industrious, taxpaying, school-sustaining, church-building people of this
District[,]” Kelly exclaimed: “How bitterly would Madison,
unimpassioned as he was, have denounced such treachery to the essential

233.
234.
235.
236.

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 849 (1865).
Id. at 849.
Id. at 977.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 182–83 (1866) (emphasis in original).
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principle of republicanism—universal suffrage.”237 As Kelley understood
the ratification debates, the word “manner” was universally
acknowledged to include who could vote. “[T]he whole country, so early
as the 9th of August, 1787, two years before the final adoption of the
Constitution, were informed that that word [‘manner’] in the clause in
question embraced not merely the method of voting, the place of voting,
and the order of voting,” he contended, “but the grand fundamental
question of who should vote, and by what power they might be invested
with the right of suffrage.”238
Few shared Kelley’s view. “Mr. Speaker, it is utterly impossible, by
any rules of construction that have ever properly been applied to language,
to place any such construction as that upon the simple clause in the
Constitution which has been read,” one representative replied.239 Another
denounced Kelley’s argument as “one of the most dangerous and startling
that has yet been suggested in connection with our national policy.”240
Kelley acknowledged the opposition, but argued that the Elections Clause
was fundamentally intended to provide for universal suffrage.
“Gentlemen tell me that this is a new construction of the Constitution,” he
acknowledged, but “I reply that it is the true one, which is enough for me,
and that the old and false one was the fruitful source of discord and war
and misery.”241
The following year, 1867, Congress did enact one statute expanding
the franchise, but the body did not clearly identify the constitutional
source of its power to do so.242 The First Reconstruction Act required the
former Confederate States to convene constitutional conventions of
delegates “elected by the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old
and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have
been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such
election,” and specified that the resulting constitutions “shall provide that
the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the
qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates.”243 The Act directly
set the qualifications for state voters, and some members sporadically
invoked the Guarantee Clause.244
237. Id. at 183.
238. Id. at 409.
239. Id. at 412 (statement of Rep. Samuel S. Marshall, D-Ill.).
240. Id. at 454 (statement of Rep. Michael C. Kerr, D-Ind.).
241. Id. at 409.
242. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1315–40, 1458–69 (1867) (debating the First
Reconstruction Act without invoking the Elections Clause).
243. First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 429 (1867).
244. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1318–19 (1867).
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Support for the claim that Congress could decide who could vote in
federal elections grew in the remaining years before the passage and
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, but no more than a small
minority of each house understood the Elections Clause that way.245 In the
Senate, Radical Republican Charles Sumner (Mass.) was the leading
supporter of congressional power over voter qualifications.
[T]here are two hostile pretensions which must be exposed; the
first, founded on a false interpretation of “qualifications,” being
nothing less than the impossible assumption that because the
States may determine the “qualifications” of electors, therefore
they can make color a criterion of the electoral franchise; and the
second, founded on a false interpretation of the asserted power of
the States “to regulate suffrage,” being nothing less than the
impossible assumption that, under the power to regulate suffrage,
the rights of a whole race may be annihilated. These two
pretensions are, of course, derived from slavery. They are hatched
from the eggs that the cuckoo bird has left behind. Strange that
Senators will hatch them . . . . Admitting that the States may
determine the “qualifications” of electors; what then? Obviously
it must be according to the legitimate meaning of this
word . . . . The Constitution, where we find this word, follows the
Declaration of Independence and refuses to recognize any
distinction of color . . . . The “qualifications” of different officers,
as President, Vice President, Senators and Representatives are
named; but “color” is not among these . . . . The dictionaries of
our language are in harmony with the Constitution. Look at
“qualifications” in Webster or Worcester, the two best authorities
of our time, and you will find that the word means “fitness”—
“ability”—“accomplishment”—“the state of being qualified;” but
it does not mean “color!” It embraces age, residence, character,
education and the payment of taxes—in short, all those conditions
which when honestly administered are in the nature of regulation,
not of disfranchisement . . . . An insurmountable condition is not
a qualification but a disfranchisement.246
Because race was not a “qualification,” he argued, then the Elections
Clause empowered Congress to protect the federal right to vote from this
unconstitutional restriction. Sumner pointed to Madison’s argument that
“[s]hould the people of any State by any means be deprived of the right

245. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173–83, 403–12, 447–60, 1054–62 (1866); CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2053–57, 3023–27 (1868); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555–
61, 642–45 (1869).
246. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3026 (1868) (emphasis in original).
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of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General
Government.”247 “Thus was it expressly understood, at the adoption of the
Constitution,” Sumner concluded, “that Congress should have the power
to prevent any State, under the pretense of regulating the suffrage, from
depriving the people of this right or from interfering with the principle of
Equality.”248
In the House, George Boutwell (R-Mass.) led the charge for the view
that the Elections Clause was the source of both federal and state power
over congressional elections. For that reason, any state power over federal
voter qualifications was subject to Congress’s controlling power to “make
or alter” state regulations of federal elections. He argued that the Voter
Qualifications Clause gives neither to the States nor to Congress the
power to determine the qualification of voters.249 Rather,
[i]t merely declares the fact that the voters for Representatives in
Congress shall possess the qualifications of voters for members
of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature . . . . But
there is no declaration in this section that either [the States or the
national Government] has the power, and certainly not that either
has the power to the exclusion of the other.250
The Elections Clause explained who “has the power,” and on what
terms:
The word “manner,” in this connection of course becomes
important . . . . It includes, as I maintain, everything relating to an
election, from the qualification of the elector to the deposit of his
ballot in the box . . . . Either one or the other of two things is true:
either these words as herein employed in their scope and meaning
cover the entire subject of elections, from the qualifications of the
voter to the deposit of his ballot in the box, or else, by necessary
legal inference, the States have not the power which they have
been in the habit of exercising . . . . But the history of the facts
from the first, and the recognition by Congress of the powers of
the States, go to the extent of conceding to them entire scope and
original control of the whole matter of voting, including the
qualifications of the voter, his registration, and the deposit of his
ballot in the box . . . . [T]herefore, when a State-rights man proves
that by the Constitution of the United States a State has a right to
decide who shall exercise the elective franchise, he has proved
also that Congress may do the same thing under this provision of
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 3027 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis in original).
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869).
Id.
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the Constitution which says that Congress may make any
regulations it chooses relating to this subject or may alter such
regulations as have been made by the States.251
Like Sumner, Boutwell closed by pointing to the purpose of the Clause at
the founding—to ensure that Congress could provide a remedy when a
state deprived people of the right to vote.252 With this authority, Boutwell
urged, federal law should prohibit denial of the right to vote on the basis
of race. Gauging support for Sumner’s and Boutwell’s position is difficult,
but their arguments were not widely taken up by their colleagues.
Congress chose to amend the Constitution instead.
2.

The Enforcement Acts

In 1870 and 1871, in the wake of the Civil War, Congress invoked its
powers under the Elections Clause and the new Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to enact three Enforcement Acts to protect the right to vote,
particularly for newly enfranchised Black men.253 The Enforcement Acts
and the associated debates underscore that Congress understood the
Elections Clause to confer expansive power over congressional elections
(the scope of the franchise aside), permitting the federal government to
establish a comprehensive code for election administration, integrity, and
security. The debates reveal a Congress focused on securing free, fair, and
racially inclusive elections by any means deemed necessary and proper,
and less concerned than its 1842 predecessor with defining the precise
scope of “manner” or identifying particularized legitimate legislative
interests.
a.

The First Enforcement Act

On May 31, 1870, Congress enacted “An Act to enforce the Right of
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union”—
the First Enforcement Act.254 As the title suggests, the Act reached beyond
the confines of the recently ratified Fifteenth Amendment (which applies
to voting restrictions on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude) to establish a federal regime for protecting the right to vote. For
that reason, the Act’s constitutionality rests in large part on the Elections
251. Id.
252. Id. at 557.
253. First Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99,
16 Stat. 433 (1871); Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3871–84 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. app. 207–14 (1871); CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1271–85, 1633–49 (1871).
254. 16 Stat. at 140.
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Clause.
The First Enforcement Act deployed sweeping federal power over
congressional elections.255 Congress created new crimes, penalties, and
civil causes of action against private individuals for interference with the
right to vote, prohibiting the use of “force, bribery, threats, intimidation,
or other unlawful means” to “hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct . . . any
citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or
from voting at any [congressional] election,”256 or “to prevent or hinder
his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his having exercised the same.”257 The Act gave federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses committed against the
provisions of the Act, and it granted to federal district and appellate courts
concurrent jurisdiction over all other actions arising under the law.258
The First Enforcement Act also marked an unprecedented exercise of
federal power over the states and their agents. For example, the statute
attempted to preempt malfeasance by state actors by deeming that any
eligible voter who offered or attempted to fulfill a state’s “prerequisite[s]”
for voting would be entitled to vote if a state officer wrongfully failed to
receive or permit the performance of the prerequisite.259 In any election
involving a congressional race, the Act declared it a federal crime for any
federal or state election officer to “neglect or refuse to perform” the duties
imposed by any federal or state election law.260 Congress established
federal protection of, and regulation over, all state voter registration
systems that served “any State or other election at which such
representative or delegate in Congress shall be chosen,” even if “the same
shall also be made for the purposes of any State, territorial, or municipal
election.”261 To escape federal reach, a state would have to operate a
completely independent election system for its own elections. Congress
authorized the military to augment the courts. The Act declared, “it shall
be lawful for the President of the United States to employ such part of the
land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be
necessary to aid in the execution of judicial process issued under this

255. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
454–59 (1988).
256. First Enforcement Act §§ 4, 5.
257. Id. § 6.
258. Id. § 8.
259. Id. § 3.
260. Id. § 22.
261. Id. § 20.
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act.”262
Relatively little debate about the Elections Clause preceded the First
Enforcement Act—seemingly less than the Apportionment Act of 1842.
Still, some House Democrats raised the familiar objection that the statute
exceeded congressional authority under the Elections Clause. “Whence
came the authority of Congress to make penal bribery, intimidation, or
influence in respect of elections in the States . . . ?” Representative
Clarkson Potter (D-N.Y.) asked.263 Finding no basis in the Elections
Clause or the Fifteenth Amendment, Potter argued that many of the Act’s
provisions “relate neither to the time, place, nor manner of holding
elections . . . nor to the denial or abridgment of suffrage on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude . . . and in all such respects,
therefore, this bill is necessarily and flagrantly without authority.”264
Representative Michael Kerr (D-Ind.) fulminated, “every single section of
this bill—twenty-three in number—save only the first, involves a palpable
violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution.”265 Kerr argued that
“[i]t was never contemplated by the people that Congress would attempt
to usurp control of the elections in the States, to dictate in what manner
they should be conducted, to put them under the supervision of Federal
officers, and give all judicial power over them to Federal courts”—but he
made no attempt to reckon with the “manner” authority provided by the
Elections Clause.266 Another member objected that the bill was “placing
in the hands of Congress all matters growing out of State elections.”267
Republicans dismissed these objections. The law’s provisions “are but
a simple exercise of the power expressly conferred on the Congress of the
United States to regulate elections of members and Delegates to
Congress,” Representative John Bingham (R-Ohio), principal author of
the Fourteenth Amendment and a legal architect of Congressional
Reconstruction, told his colleagues.268 Bingham explained,
the sum total of the outcry against this bill is that by it the equal
rights of the people of this country are to be enforced, for the first
time in the history of the Republic, by a national statute and by
the whole power of the Union and of the people of all the States.269
Representative Noah Davis (R-N.Y.) thundered, “it is true . . . that
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. § 13.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3876 (1870).
Id.
Id. at 3872.
Id. at 3872–73.
Id. at 3875 (statement of Rep. James B. Beck, D-Ky.).
Id. at 3872.
Id. at 3883.
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heretofore in the history of this country it has not been necessary for
Congress to interfere for the purpose of preserving the purity of the
election of members of this House. But has not that time now arrived?”270
Amid the white violence and subterfuge prevailing in the former
Confederate States, “members of this body cannot be elected fairly and
according to the will of those entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
unless Congress intervenes and exercises that dormant power that has so
long existed, but which has never yet been exercised.”271
Indeed, the debates were studded with lurid claims about how the
Enforcement Act subjugated white people, particularly when a draft of the
bill also included measures ending racial discrimination in the taxation
and treatment of immigrants.272 Opponents chastised the Bill as unfair
favoritism towards freed slaves. “The bill now before us seeks to give the
negro rights, safeguards, and remedies which are withheld from the white
man,” one representative complained with reference to section 5, which
provided additional protection for the right to vote of anyone “to whom
the right of suffrage is secured or guaranteed by the fifteenth
amendment.”273 “[Y]ou cannot with impunity trample upon this great
white race,” he added, arguing that if Congress “humiliate[d] and
degrade[d] the white man” by enacting the Enforcement Act, states would
simply adopt literacy tests (as Massachusetts had) and enfranchise
immigrants to “increase[]” “the white majority at the polls.”274 In response
to statements of unabashed white supremacy, Representative Davis
tersely affirmed that the bill “simply prohibits crime.”275
The final version of the First Enforcement Act passed the House with
133 yeas, 58 nays, and 39 members not voting,276 and passed the Senate
with 48 yeas and 11 nays.277

270. Id. at 3881.
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. John D. Stiles, D-Pa.) (“I protest against this outrage in the
name of every white voter in this country. . . . I protest against it because I am in favor of a white
man’s Government upon this continent, and utterly opposed to forcing upon an unwilling people
negro suffrage, negro equality, and negro supremacy . . . .”); id. at 3877 (statement of Rep. James A.
Johnson, D-Cal.) (“Mr. Speaker, this bill ought to be entitled an act to foster paganism . . . to foster
child murder, to strike down Christianity, and to deprive the people of their liberties. Of course nearly
all of this long conglomeration of vicious verbiage is directed against the white man and in favor of
the Chinaman.”).
273. Id. at 3874 (statement of Rep. Beck, D-Ky.).
274. Id. at 3874–75.
275. Id. at 3881.
276. Id. at 3884.
277. Id. at 3809.
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The Second Enforcement Act

The following year, Congress enacted the Second Enforcement Act,278
framed as a set of amendments to its predecessor. The law established a
new system of federal election administration and supervision. At the
request of two citizens in any town of at least twenty thousand people,
each United States circuit judge was required to commission two local
“supervisors of election” to “guard[] and scrutinize[]” voter registration
and balloting.279 These federal election supervisors were authorized to
“personally inspect and scrutinize such registry . . . in such manner as
will, in their or his judgment, detect and expose the improper or wrongful
removal therefrom, or addition thereto, in any way, of any name or
names.”280 They were also authorized to supervise and challenge the
counting of the votes,281 to maintain clear lines of sight over all election
processes,282 and to investigate and challenge the seating of any
representative-elect whose election defied the new regime.283 Congress
criminalized the obstruction of these supervisors or any other federal
election administration officials—including the federal marshals and
deputies tasked with enforcing much of the new election system—and
undermining the integrity of the voter registration system.284 The Act also
required the states to conduct congressional elections with paper ballots,
expressly displacing all state laws that said otherwise: “[A]ll votes for
representatives in Congress shall hereafter be by written or printed ballot,
any law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; and all votes
received or recorded contrary to the provisions of this section shall be of
none effect.”285 Finally, the Second Enforcement Act doubled down on
enforcement. Among other things, Congress empowered the federal
marshals to enlist the local bystanders to combat violent resistance286 and
gave the federal courts complete jurisdiction over all matters arising under
the Enforcement Acts.287
These additions to the growing federal election system prompted
vigorous, if far from novel, congressional debate about the meaning of the
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
Id. § 2.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 10.
Id. § 19.
Id. § 12.
Id. § 15.
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Elections Clause.
Some opponents raised the tired objection that Congress could only
exercise its Elections Clause power if states defaulted on their duty to
provide for congressional elections or otherwise threatened the existence
of Congress.288 Although Kerr argued that Congress could only act under
very limited circumstances, he conceded that once Congress could act, it
could set up the very sort of federal election administration system the two
Enforcement Acts had created.289 In those emergencies,
Congress may declare that elections shall be held at certain times
and at certain places and in a certain manner; for example, that
ballot-boxes shall be opened at each voting precinct . . . , and that
an election board shall be organized there under Federal laws, and
in the persons of one inspector and two judges.290
When another opponent of the Second Enforcement Act, Senator George
Vickers (D-Md.), rose to make a similar argument that Congress could act
only for “reasons of absolute, unqualified necessity,” he included among
those “paramount reasons of State” not only “to perpetuate the existence
of the Government,” but also “to preserve representation” and “to protect
minorities by the district system.”291
Other opponents resurrected the anti-commandeering objection.
Representative Charles Eldridge, for example, asked indignantly whether
anyone would argue that under the Elections Clause, or any other
constitutional provision, “the Governors of the States and all other State
officers can, under penalties, be required by the Federal Government to
serve as its officers and do its bidding[.]”292
Some lawmakers questioned whether the “manner of holding
elections” included the wide range of regulation imposed by the Second
Enforcement Act.293 In response, the statute’s supporters, as in previous
288. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1277 (1871).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1633. Immediately after it passed, Vickers moved (unsuccessfully) to rename it “An act
to prevent the free and intelligent voters of the United States from exercising the right of suffrage.”
Id. at 1655.
292. Id. at 1272.
293. See, e.g., id. at app. 208 (“[W]hat is meant by the word ‘manner,’ and with what power does
this simple word invest Congress? for it is upon this word, and this word only, that this measure is at
all pretended to be justified. . . . Congress may, under this power, prescribe how the votes shall be
received for Representatives, whether by ballot or viva voce; how they shall be counted or canvassed,
how they shall be returned, and how certified; authorize the kind of ballot-boxes to be used, and such
like things connected with the ‘holding’ of the election. Nothing more could have been
intended . . . .”); id. at 1637 (“But what right has Congress to interfere with the registration of voters?
What clause of the Constitution gives them the right? The States have the exclusive power to judge
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decades, answered that the Clause granted Congress comprehensive
power to regulate congressional elections. Calling attention to the
Elections Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Representative William Lawrence (R-Ohio) contended,
“Congress could provide officers to conduct the elections of
Representatives in Congress. Under these provisions Congress may define
and punish crimes against the exercise of the elective franchise in the
election of Representatives in Congress.”294 Just as the constitutional
power to tax permits Congress to criminalize violations of the revenue
laws, and the constitutional power to establish post offices permits
congress to define offenses against the postal service, so too “the power
to make regulations as to the ‘times, places, and manner’ of holding
elections for Representatives in Congress carries with it the right to define
penal offenses against the exercise of the elective franchise.”295
Representative Burton Cook (R-Ill.) likewise argued that the power to
correct violations of election law was inherent in Congress’s “manner”
authority:
if these frauds in the elections grow to any extent out of the
manner of conducting the elections, then clearly to that extent the
remedy is within our power, and we are called upon to apply that
remedy by every consideration that would induce us to preserve
our free Government and preserve the liberties of our people.296
Cook emphasized that
there can be no valid reason urged against the passage of this bill,
unless it can be shown that under a fair and reasonable
administration of this act, if it should become a law, men who are
justly entitled to vote would be deprived of their right to do so.297
And he pointed out that “[n]o evidence” had been produced to that
effect.298
The bill’s proponents argued that the enforcement legislation was
authorized on even the narrowest traditional grounds: Congress’s need to
protect itself from subversion by states. In this emergency, nothing less
than a federal election code could secure Congress’s fundamental interest
in its own existence and integrity. Bingham stated the case clearly. “Your
of and fix the qualifications of voters; not denying or abridging the right by reason of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. The States are to fix the age and residence. The ‘manner’ of
conducting an election refers to a different subject.”).
294. Id. at 1276.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1280.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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Constitution would have been only a glittering bauble if it had not
conferred, as it did confer, upon the national Legislature the power of selfpreservation,” he began.299 “Who does not know that if the State
Legislature should choose to incumber the exercise of this power with
inconvenient or impossible conditions, and if the national Congress had
not the power to overrule or alter such conditions, the nation would
perish?”300 Others concurred. “The idea that Congress cannot protect the
national Government in the election of the very officers who are to make
its laws is supremely ridiculous and absurd,” Lawrence argued.301 “This
power to preserve the purity of the ballot is simply the exercise of that
inherent power, which this, like every other Government has—a power
higher, if possible, than the Constitution—the power of preserving its own
existence when that existence is threatened by force or fraud . . . .”302
Lawrence reasoned that no member could deny that such force and fraud
had already occurred:
Sir, we all know that Kuklux outrages have been committed, not
only in North Carolina, where it was recently necessary to call out
a military force to protect the people at the elections, but in other
States of the South; and that in more than one city of this Union
enormous frauds have been perpetrated upon the ballot-box.303
Even if the legislation was unprecedented, the crisis was unprecedented
too. “It is said that the last clause of this section [of the Elections Clause]
giving the power to Congress has fallen into abeyance, never having been
used, and should now be considered but as a dead letter,” Representative
Cook said.304 “Sir, the men who framed this Constitution foresaw that the
exigency might arise, as it has arisen, requiring the exercise of this power
by Congress, and they provided for its exercise when that exigency should
arise.”305
The bill passed the House by a vote of 144 yeas, 64 nays, and 32
members not voting,306 and the Senate by a vote of 39 yeas to 10 nays.307

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 1283.
Id.
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1655.
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The Third Enforcement Act

Less than two months later, Congress enacted a third Enforcement Act,
also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.308 The third Enforcement Act,
known as “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes,” pursued some of its other purposes through the Elections
Clause.309 Most of the Act’s provisions increased federal military and
judicial authority over regional violence, but section 2 of the Act also
created a new civil cause of action against voter intimidation and related
interference with the right to vote, which remains in the U.S. Code as
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and a criminal equivalent, which does not.310 The
House passed its first version by 118–91,311 and the Senate passed its own
by a vote of 45–19.312 The House approved the final bill by a vote of 93
yeas, 74 nays, and 63 not voting,313 and the Senate approved it with 36
yeas and 13 nays.314
Because this second section of the Act resembled the sixth section of
the First Enforcement Act, which created a cause of action against
conspiracies to violate the rights of federal citizenship, Congress engaged
in little original constitutional debate. As Representative Samuel
Shellabarger (R-Ohio) said while making the case for the bill, “it rests
upon exactly the same legal ground, and is in its constitutional aspects
identical with [the First Enforcement Act], the only difference being that
the section of this bill defines the offense with greater exactness.”315 Only
James Garfield felt the need to mention the Elections Clause as the source
of constitutional authority for this federal protection of the right to vote,
and his remarks on this point appear to have been relatively
uncontroversial. Garfield acknowledged that it had been repeatedly
argued “that the clause in the main text which gives to Congress the power
to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding elections carried with
it the whole question of suffrage. I was never able to believe that this
clause went so far.”316 But, he continued, “I did believe, and I do now
believe, that it goes so far that, with the fifteenth amendment superadded,
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
Id.
Id. § 2.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 831.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871).
Id. at 154.
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Congress is armed with more than a mere negative power, and had the
right to pass the enforcement act of May last [i.e., the First Enforcement
Act].”317
III. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE IN FEDERAL COURTS
A.

Reconstruction

The three Enforcement Acts marked Congress’s first foray into creating
a federal scheme of election regulations that went beyond districting. At
the same time, the Acts granted federal courts jurisdiction over matters
arising under the new laws. It’s no surprise then, that the Enforcement
Acts offered federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the first
occasions to opine meaningfully on the Elections Clause and its scope.
Before Reconstruction, courts typically referred to the Elections Clause
as a way to understand some other issue or unrelated aspect of law.318 For
example, in establishing the foundational principle that federal courts
retain the power to review state court decisions interpreting federal law or
the Constitution, in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,319 Justice Story pointed to
the Elections Clause as an instance in which the Constitution makes
federal law supreme.320 In interpreting the word “manner” as used in a
statute providing pensions to widows of the Revolutionary War, the Court
of Claims explained that the word was so broad as used in the Elections
Clause to permit Congress to enact the Apportionment Act of 1842 and
compel elections by district.321
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York appears to
have been the first federal court to elaborate on the purpose of the
Elections Clause when the court considered the constitutionality of the
317. Id.
318. See Tolson, Congressional Authority, supra note 15, at 361 (“Prior to Reconstruction, there
was not much mention of the Elections Clause in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, much less any
thorough analysis of the meaning of its terms.”).
319. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
320. Id. at 343; see also Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 497–98 (1849) (Daniel,
J., dissenting) (arguing states exercise powers “until they shall be superseded by a paramount
authority vested in the Federal government,” including those in the Elections Clause).
321. Smith v. United States, 1857 WL 4176, at *3 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 16, 1857) (“[In 1842 it] was
considered by Congress that in the word ‘manner’ was included the power to prescribe that
congressional districts should each be composed of contiguous territory, although in some of the
States the elections for members of Congress had already been had by general ticket. Whether the
authority of Congress in this particular has ever been contested or not, this act shows the construction
given by Congress to the word manner. Now, if the manner of holding an election means that Congress
may provide that the election of its members shall be by districts composed of contiguous territory,
the word is surely comprehensive enough in the present case to mean that the pension shall commence
on the 4th of March, 1848.”).
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First Enforcement Act less than six months after the law’s passage. 322
Noah Davis was the attorney who argued that the Act (and a criminal
prosecution thereunder) was constitutional under the Elections Clause.323
Davis had been a congressman from New York and had vocally defended
the Act just months earlier.324 President Grant appointed Davis to be the
U.S. District Attorney (now known as “U.S. Attorney”) for the Southern
District of New York in July of 1870.325 As the first court to examine the
underpinnings of the Elections Clause in nearly a century of the
provision’s existence, United States v. Quinn326 should be foundational to
understanding the meaning and purpose of the Clause—but it has never
been cited by the Supreme Court or any other federal court in analyzing
the scope of the Clause.
The Quinn Court looked to the intent in drafting and adopting the
Elections Clause, examining “the explanations which were given by the
great and good men who expounded it.”327 The court repeatedly
recognized the singular importance of an accurate and fair vote:
those framers of the constitution did not, for one moment, lose
sight of the indispensable condition—on which alone a
government of the people could be safe to the people themselves
or could secure the beneficent ends for which it was instituted—
that her popular vote should be the true expression of the opinions
and choice of the electors.328
And the court articulated the Framers’ underlying fears that “the states
might become indifferent to the general good,” and as a result fail to
hold congressional elections or put obstacles in the way of “the full
and fair expression of the popular voice.”329
Each of Congress’s powers under the Elections Clause was, according
to the Quinn Court, intended to ensure the people could express their voice
through a fair vote. For example, Congress needed the authority to set the
time of elections because “[t]ime might some where be so arranged, and
for some end other than the well-being of the whole nation, that the
322. See United States v. Quinn, 27 F. Cas. 673 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 16,110).
323. Id. at 676.
324. See supra notes 270, 271, 275.
325. Davis, Noah, (1818–1902), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000126 [https://perma.cc/WWM5-QAFY]. Davis was a
personal friend of President Grant’s, according to Davis’s obituary. See Ex-Justice Davis Dead, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 1902), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/03/21/101942952.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WPZ9-6VJU].
326. 27 F. Cas. 673 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 16,110).
327. Id. at 678.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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popular voice might be denied a full expression.”330 Congress likewise
required superseding power to establish the place of elections because
“[p]lace might be so fixed as in that mode to defeat the general and the
indispensable purpose.”331 Lastly, Congress retained authority over the
manner of conducting elections because “[t]he manner of holding an
election might be such as to operate to prevent an open, fair expression of
the popular voice.”332 The Elections Clause was designed to avoid a
scenario in which “either through an indifference of the states or
otherwise, that the general government might find itself unsupported by
the very people in whose will the foundations of the government
rested.”333 The Quinn Court plainly stated that the “principle on which it
was declared that this clause might be useful” was that “all legal voters
should have full and fair opportunity to deposit their votes.”334
Similarly, where defendants challenged the constitutionality of the law
under which they were prosecuted for conspiracy to intimidate voters, a
federal court in Louisiana concluded that the law was “clearly within the
constitutional power of congress” as granted by the Elections Clause.335
That provision was “framed to secure the existence of the government
itself, and was made in the interest of all the people of all the states.” 336
The Elections Clause, along with the Voter Qualifications Clause, was
“intended to place the election of representatives in the ultimate power of
congress, so as to secure at all times a house of representatives, first by
preventing obstructive legislation by the states, and, second, securing to
the voter the protection of the general government.”337
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of the
Enforcement Acts in 1875, in two decisions issued on the same day—
United States v. Reese338 and United States v. Cruikshank.339 Neither
relied on the Elections Clause,340 and both cases reflect the Court’s well-

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. United States v. Goldman, 25 F. Cas. 1350, 1354 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No 15,225).
336. Id. at 1353.
337. Id. at 1354.
338. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
339. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
340. Reese expressly disclaimed application of the Clause because the case involved an election
for state representatives only. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
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covered narrowing of the Reconstruction Amendments.341
Five years later, the Court was confronted with a challenge to other
provisions of the First and Second Enforcement Acts in the context of a
federal election. In Ex parte Siebold,342 defendants (some of whom were
election judges) were charged with stuffing ballot boxes and engaging in
other acts of interference in and manipulation of a congressional election
in Maryland.343 The Court upheld several provisions of the First and
Second Enforcement Acts as expressly authorized by the Elections
Clause. In so doing, the Court embraced Congress’s broad authority to
legislate under the Clause and rejected the argument that Congress could
not enact partial federal regulations:
After first authorizing the States to prescribe the regulations, it is
added, ‘The Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such
regulations.’ ‘Make or alter:’ What is the plain meaning of these
words? . . . There is no declaration that the regulations shall be
made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by
Congress. If Congress does not interfere, of course they may be
made wholly by the State; but if it chooses to interfere, there is
nothing in the words to prevent its doing so, either wholly or
partially. On the contrary, their necessary implication is that it
may do either. It may either make the regulations, or it may alter
them.344
In fact, the Siebold Court expressly blessed the 1842 Apportionment Act.
“No one will pretend,” it stated, “at least at the present day, that these laws
were unconstitutional because they only partially covered the subject.”345
The Court rejected concerns about Congress and states legislating on the
same issue concurrently, because federal regulations are always
“paramount” to state laws where the two conflict.346 The Court upheld the
federal punishment of state officers for violating state laws, the violation
of which was made punishable by the Enforcement Acts, because the state
officers also owed duties to the United States and because Congress could
effectively adopt state laws and “demand[] their fulfilment.”347

341. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341,
2350–51 (2003) (cataloguing the substantial scholarship on the Court’s hollowing of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments).
342. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
343. Id. at 377–79.
344. Id. at 383–84 (emphasis in original).
345. Id. at 384.
346. Id.; see also id. at 386.
347. Id. at 387–88.
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For the first time, the Supreme Court in Siebold declared “that
Congress has plenary and paramount jurisdiction over the whole subject”
of federal elections.348 Like the lower court in Quinn, the Supreme Court
rejected any suggestion that the absence of significant federal elections
legislation prior to 1870 diminished Congress’s broad authority on the
subject:
If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws,
imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations
of duty committed by officers of election, it has been because the
exigency has not been deemed sufficient to require it, and not
because Congress had not the requisite power.349
The Court acknowledged that the “exigency” had arrived: “In the light of
recent history, and of the violence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity
which have frequently prevailed at such elections, it may easily be
conceived that the exertion of the power, if it exists, may be necessary to
the stability of our frame of government.”350 In other words, voter
intimidation and violence, fraud, and interference with election integrity
had become issues of self-preservation for the federal government.
The Supreme Court decided a companion case, Ex parte Clarke,351 on
the same day as Siebold. An election officer had been convicted under the
Enforcement Act for neglecting to convey a poll-book to the county clerk
of court and for permitting the poll-book to be broken open.352 The Court
upheld the conviction and denied the motion for habeas corpus, relying on
its reasoning in Siebold.353 Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford,
dissented from the majority opinions in Siebold and Clarke, arguing, in
part, that the Elections Clause’s “make or alter” power did not permit
Congress to penalize violations of state law.354 Justice Field relied on the
debates during the constitutional and state ratification conventions,
pointing to language from the Framers that identified self-preservation as
the primary purpose for the Clause.355 Justice Field also echoed the anti348. Id. at 388.
349. Id.
350. Id.; id. at 382.
351. 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
352. Id. at 400–01.
353. Id. at 403–04 (“The principal question is, whether Congress had constitutional power to enact
a law for punishing a State officer of election for the violation of his duty under a State statute in
reference to an election of a representative to Congress. As this question has been fully considered in
the previous case, it is unnecessary to add any thing further on the subject. Our opinion is, that
Congress had constitutional power to enact the law; and that the cause of commitment was lawful and
sufficient.”).
354. Id. at 415–16 (Field, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 416–19.
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commandeering arguments of the Framers and members of Congress who
had urged limitations on, or at least a narrower interpretation of, the
Elections Clause.356 Once again, however, this restrained view of
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause was a minority opinion that
did not carry the day.
The Court reaffirmed its broad view of the Elections Clause in Ex parte
Yarbrough,357 a unanimous opinion that upheld the Third Enforcement
Act’s criminal provisions against conspiracy to intimidate federal voters
and conspiracy to deny the “free exercise or enjoyment” of federal
privileges or immunities.358 Eight men sought habeas relief after being
convicted of conspiring to prevent Berry Saunders, a Black man, from
voting in Georgia’s congressional election, and carrying out that
conspiracy by violently assaulting Mr. Saunders on account of his race.359
In response, the Court announced Congress’s unmitigated power to
protect voters and the integrity of federal elections:
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which
is superior to the general government, it must have the power to
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence
and corruption. If it has not this power it is left helpless before the
two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open
violence and insidious corruption.360
Again rejecting the argument that Congress’s delay in deploying its
Elections Clause authority diminished his power,361 the Court explained
that Congress’s powers must include the authority to: “provide laws for
the proper conduct of those elections[;]” “provide, if necessary, the
officers who shall conduct them and make return of the result[;]” “to
provide, in an election held under its own authority, for security of life
and limb to the voter while in the exercise of this function[;]” and “protect
the act of voting, the place where it is done, and the man who votes, from
personal violence or intimidation and the election itself from corruption
or fraud[.]”362
Looking beyond “specific sources of the power to pass these laws[,]”
the Court relied on fundamental principles of American democracy in a
356. Id.
357. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
358. Id. at 654–55 (quoting 70 Rev. Stat. § 5508).
359. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 655–57.
360. Id. at 657–58.
361. Id. at 660–61.
362. Id. at 661; see also id. at 662 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise
this right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account of so doing.”).
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lofty conclusion:
It is as essential to the successful working of this government that
the great organisms of its executive and legislative branches
should be the free choice of the people as that the original form
of it should be so. . . . In a republican government, like ours,
where political power is reposed in representatives of the entire
body of the people, chosen at short intervals by popular elections,
the temptations to control these elections by violence and by
corruption is a constant source of danger. Such has been the
history of all republics, and, though ours has been comparatively
free from both these evils in the past, no lover of his country can
shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources.363
Recognizing the profound terror and unrest inflicted throughout the South,
the Court also predicted other election manipulations—namely, the
distorting effect of money in politics—that were still to come.364 The
Constitution must include the power to prevent against such “evils,”
because if not “the country [is] in danger, and its best powers, its highest
purposes, the hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are
at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute
force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other.”365
After Yarbrough, the Supreme Court continued to uphold the
constitutionality of federal criminal penalties for voter intimidation and
federal supervision of congressional elections.366 Lower federal courts
likewise followed Siebold and Yarbrough, repeatedly recognizing the
breadth of Congress’s constitutional authority to enact laws to ensure
election integrity and protect the right of citizens to vote freely and

363. Id. at 666–67.
364. Id. at 667 (“If the recurrence of such acts as these prisoners stand convicted of are too common
in one quarter of the country, and give omen of danger from lawless violence, the free use of money
in elections, arising from the vast growth of recent wealth in other quarters, presents equal cause for
anxiety.”).
365. Id.
366. See, e.g., Ex parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888) (“[T]he power, under the constitution of the
United States, of Congress to make such provisions as are necessary to secure the fair and honest
conduct of an election at which a member of Congress is elected, as well as the preservation, proper
return, and counting of the votes cast thereat, and, in fact, whatever is necessary to an honest and fair
certification of such election, cannot be questioned. The right of Congress to do this, by adopting the
statutes of the States, and enforcing them by its own sanctions, is conceded by counsel to be
established.” (citing Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879))); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263,
293–94 (1892), abrogated on other grounds by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); United
States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (holding that criminal penalties for voter intimidation are
constitutional because it is “unquestionable that the right to have one’s vote counted is as open to
protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box” (citing Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651; Logan,
144 U.S. at 293)).
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without interference.367
B.

The Wide Range of Elections Clause Powers

As Congress and states began exercising their Elections Clause powers
more regularly in the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court repeatedly
reasserted the extraordinary breadth of the “[t]imes, [p]laces, and
[m]anner”368 authority under the provision and largely approved of
legislation regulating a wide range of aspects of elections.
In an oft-quoted passage, the Court affirmed in Smiley v. Holm369 that
“[i]t cannot be doubted that” the “comprehensive words” of Article 1,
Section 4
embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to
notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes,
duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication
of election returns.370
Explicitly recognizing that this list was not exhaustive, the Court
explained that the Elections Clause authorizes States “in short, to enact
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right
involved.”371 The Court went on to acknowledge that this broad power
extended to Congress, which may issue “regulations of the same general
character” as States and “may supplement these state regulations or may
substitute its own” because Congress “has a general supervisory power
over the whole subject.”372 The Court has also recognized that breadth of
Congress’s power under the Elections Clause is further bolstered by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.373
Although it was never disputed that the Elections Clause included the
power to draw and redraw districts, in Smiley, the Court held that nothing
in the Elections Clause prohibited State redistricting legislation from
367. See, e.g., Ex parte Geissler, 4 F. 188, 191 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1880); United States v. Munford, 16
F. 223, 228 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1883); Ex parte Morrill, 35 F. 261, 265–66 (C.C.D. Or. 1888).
368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
369. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
370. Id. at 366.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 366–67 (citation omitted).
373. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (finding that the Necessary and Proper
Clause “leaves to the Congress the choice of means by which its constitutional powers are to be carried
into execution” in order to “safeguard the right of choice by the people of representatives in
Congress”).
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being subject to the governor’s veto power.374 In so holding, the Court
implicitly accepted that the power to redistrict is part of the Elections
Clause authority. Since Smiley, the Court has confirmed this conclusion
explicitly. For example, in Wesberry v. Sanders,375 an apportionment
challenge, the Court delved into the constitutional ratification debates and
explained that the Framers intended the Elections Clause to give Congress
the power to rectify the malapportionment that had developed in certain
state legislatures and to “lay the state off into districts.”376 Even as it
acknowledged that the breadth of Congress’s power under the Elections
Clause was controversial during the constitutional debates, the Supreme
Court has treated as undisputed that Article 1, Section 4 left “in state
legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elections,” and
“permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’ those districts if it wished.”377 The
Court went on to list the many instances in which Congress had exercised
such power, “in particular to restrain the practice of political
gerrymandering.”378
In addition to redistricting, the Court has recognized Congress’s power
to issue regulations pertaining to voter registration,379 campaign finance

374. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 372–73.
375. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
376. Id. at 16 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 71).
377. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004).
378. Id. at 276–77; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019)
(“Congress has regularly exercised its Elections Clause power, including to address partisan
gerrymandering.); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1970) (“The Framers expected Congress
to use this power [in Article I, Section 4] to eradicate ‘rotten boroughs,’ and Congress has in fact used
its power to prevent States from electing all Congressmen at large.”) (citations omitted); cf. Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015) (holding that the
Elections Clause permitted Arizona voters to amend the state constitution by proposition to vest
congressional redistricting power in the newly created Independent Redistricting Commission).
379. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013) (“The Clause’s
substantive scope is broad. ‘Times, Places, and Manner,’ we have written, are ‘comprehensive words,’
which ‘embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections,’ including, as
relevant here and as petitioners do not contest, regulations relating to ‘registration.’ . . . The power of
Congress over the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be
exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and
no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.’”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smiley, 285 U.S., at 366; Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879)).

Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete)

1058

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/11/2021 4:05 PM

[Vol. 96:997

and corruption,380 primary elections,381 recounts,382 party affiliation
rules,383 and balloting384 (so long as the balloting rule did not
impermissibly attempt to regulate electoral outcomes). In each of these
cases, the Court remarked on the comprehensive and wide-ranging scope
of the Elections Clause power.
The Court’s jurisprudence is muddier with respect to whether Congress
can expand the electorate using its Elections Clause powers. In Oregon v.
Mitchell,385 Justice Black, announcing the judgments for the Court,
concluded that Congress can require states to permit 18-year-olds to vote
in federal elections, but could not do so for state elections.386 Relying on
the Elections Clause, as “augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause,”387 Justice Black explained that
[t]he breadth of power granted to Congress to make or alter
election regulations in national elections, including the
qualifications of voters, is demonstrated by the fact that the
Framers of the Constitution and the state legislatures which
ratified it intended to grant to Congress the power to lay out or
alter the boundaries of the congressional districts.388
Four justices agreed with Justice Black that Congress could lawfully
require states to extend the franchise to eighteen-year-olds for federal

380. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545–47 (1934) (relying heavily on Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), to uphold as constitutional the financial disclosure and reporting
requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“This
Court has also held that it has very broad authority to prevent corruption in national Presidential
elections.” (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. 534)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 (“The constitutional power of
Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties
in this case.”); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 187 (2003), overruled on other
grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (“Congress has a fully
legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of
federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen.”).
381. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 319–20 (1941) (overturning Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232 (1921)); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 n.16 (recognizing that Classic overturned
Newberry); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69–73, 71 n.2 (1997) (invalidating Louisiana’s “open
primary” law because the law conflicted with time of elections set by federal statute pursuant to the
Elections Clause).
382. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1972).
383. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (holding that a state can require that an independent
candidate be unaffiliated with a political party for one year prior to a primary election).
384. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001).
385. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
386. Id. at 134–35.
387. Id. at 120.
388. Id. at 121.
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elections, but did so on different grounds.389 Writing separately, Justice
Stewart, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed that
Congress could regulate some voter qualifications through the Equal
Protection Clause, but could not do so with respect to age because the state
laws that set the voting age at twenty-one did not “invidiously
discriminate against any discrete and insular minority.”390
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,391 the Supreme Court
later confirmed that the Constitution does “not require a perfect symmetry
of voter qualifications in state and federal legislative elections.”392 The
Court unequivocally rejected the argument that the Voter Qualifications
Clause requires identical voter qualifications in state and federal
legislative elections as “plainly inconsistent” with Mitchell.393 However,
Justice Stevens, with Justice Scalia, dissented and argued that the opinions
of eight justices in Mitchell were consistent with the proposition that the
Constitution “requires the same qualifications for state and federal
elections.”394 More recently, justices have weighed in on this question,
though in dicta or in minority opinions. For example, in a 2013 decision
striking down Arizona’s law requiring would-be voters to provide proof
of U.S. citizenship, Justice Scalia waded into the debate, writing that
“Prescribing voting qualifications . . . forms no part of the power to be
conferred upon the national government by the Elections Clause, which is
expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the
manner of elections.”395 Notwithstanding nonbinding statements to the
contrary, Mitchell and Tashijian represent the state of the law: Congress
can expand the federal electorate beyond state law voter qualifications.
Perfect symmetry is not required so long as all electors for the most

389. See id. at 135–44 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding Congress can compel states to permit
eighteen-year-olds to vote in federal and state elections pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 239–81 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing with Justices White and Marshall, Justice Brennan
dissented from the judgment insofar as it declared the age requirement unconstitutional as applied to
state and local elections and concluded that Congress could compel states to extend the franchise to
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause).
390. Id. at 293–96 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
391. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
392. Id. at 229.
393. Id. The Voter Qualifications Clause provides: “The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
State Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
394. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
395. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) (citations omitted)
(emphases in original); see also id. at 29–33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Husted v. A. Philip Randolph
Inst., 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1849–50 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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numerous state legislative body also qualify as electors for federal office.
C.

Exceptions to the Rule?

Three cases run counter to the great weight of jurisprudence
recognizing the Elections Clause as a broad grant of power to Congress;
one of these cases has since been overturned and another has been called
into question—by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.396 and by the sweep of history.
In Newberry v. United States,397 the court struck down portions of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act that placed spending limits on spending in
primaries or other nomination processes for federal office, in part because
the term “elections” in Article I, Section 4 did not include primary
elections because that procedure was “unknown” to the Framers.398 But
the Court later rejected this rule in United States v. Classic,399 explaining
that when the Elections Clause is “read in the sense which is plainly
permissible and in the light of the constitutional purpose,” the Court was
required “to hold that a primary election . . . is an election within the
meaning of the constitutional provision and is subject to congressional
regulation as to the manner of holding it.”400 The Classic Court explained
that the Necessary and Proper Clause—when operating in conjunction
with the Elections Clause—grants Congress the power to legislate to
“safeguard the right of choice by the people of representatives in
Congress.”401
In United States v. Gradwell,402 the Court held that criminal prohibition
of fraud against the United States did not extend to election fraud
(specifically, bribery of electors).403 To reach this conclusion, the Court
looked at Congress’s history of exercising its Elections Clause power to
date, and noted that Congress had rarely interfered with state regulations
of elections, except for a period of twenty-four years.404 The Court wrote
off as an aberration the period from 1870 (when Congress issued muscular
elections regulations though the Enforcement Acts) to 1894 (when
Congress repealed a substantial portion of these laws as Reconstruction

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

570 U.S. 1 (2013).
256 U.S. 232 (1921).
Id. at 250.
313 U.S. 299 (1941)
Id. at 320.
Id.
243 U.S. 476 (1917).
Id.
Id. at 482–84.
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gave way to Redemption). The Court could not expressly state that
Congress lacked the authority to regulate on congressional elections;
instead, the Court explained that it was merely a matter of “policy” that
had prevented Congress from doing so.405 Because Congress had
previously exercised its election authority “by positive and clear statutes,”
the Gradwell Court declined to read an election regulation into “a law for
the protection of the revenue.”406
In practice, Gradwell has not narrowed the Court’s interpretation of the
Elections Clause. Indeed, in explaining why the presumption against
preemption does not apply in Elections Clause cases, Justice Scalia
limited Gradwell to its facts, explaining that the “provision at issue was
adopted in a tax-enforcement bill, and that Congress had enacted but then
repealed other criminal statutes specifically covering election fraud.”407
Thus, “Gradwell says nothing at all about pre-emption, or about how to
construe statutes (like the NVRA) in which Congress has indisputably
undertaken ‘to regulate such elections.’”408 Indeed, Congress’s adoption
of sweeping regulation of federal elections throughout the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries all but nullifies Gradwell.
Finally, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,409 the Court held that a
state could not impose term limits on U.S. representatives or senators
because the “Times, Places and Manner” authority granted to states did
not contain the power to determine the qualifications for federal office.410
Such power would contravene the intent of the Framers, who were
motivated by “evident concern that States would try to undermine the
National Government.”411 Justice Stevens several times noted that the
Elections Clause was intended to grant Congress control over the
“procedural” aspects of elections (i.e., how elections are run), rather than
the “substantive” qualifications of candidates for office.412 But it would
be a mistake to read Justice Stevens’s focus on election procedure too
narrowly, given the Framers’ emphasis on the breadth of the Elections
Clause (e.g., “words of great latitude”), the intent to protect against voter
405. Id. at 482 (“Although Congress has had this power of regulating the conduct of congressional
elections from the organization of the government, our legislative history upon the subject shows that
except for about twenty-four of the one hundred and twenty-eight years since the government was
organized, it has been its policy to leave such regulations almost entirely to the states, whose
representatives Congressmen are.”).
406. Id. at 485.
407. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 13 n.5 (2013) (emphasis in original).
408. Id. (emphasis in original).
409. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
410. Id. at 828.
411. Id. at 810.
412. Id. at 810, 832–35.
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suppression and intimidation, and early Elections Clause legislation
(approved by the Supreme Court) aimed at ensuring free and fair
elections.413
D.

Who Is a “Legislature”?

The most voluble recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Clause
has addressed what once seemed like a quirky, ancillary issue. The
Republican legislature challenged Arizona’s nonpartisan redistricting
commission, which had been established by ballot measure under the
state’s constitution.414 The commission violated the Elections Clause, the
lawsuit insisted, because only the “legislature” could set the “times,
places, and manner” of balloting and districts—and the voters were not
the legislature.415 This argument, if successful, would have put at risk
numerous other ballot measures in states across the country, especially in
western states that joined the Union in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth Centuries, with direct democracy as part of their constitutions.
In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission,416 by 5–4, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not bar
the people of Arizona from direct democracy when it came to the method
for drawing district lines. “The history and purpose of the Clause weigh
heavily against such preclusion, as does the animating principle of our
Constitution that the people themselves are the originating source of all
the powers of government.”417 Ominously for future jurisprudence,
Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the majority. Chief Justice John Roberts
wrote a stinging dissent, arguing that “legislature” must mean only the
representative body.418 Kennedy’s retirement augured a future Supreme
Court ruling striking down dozens of state election procedures and
provisions enacted by voters over the decades.
However, in Rucho, even as Roberts wrote that the courts could not
police partisan gerrymandering, he acknowledged that Congress and state
voters could. At length he cited with approval how
numerous . . . States are restricting partisan considerations in
districting through legislation. One way they are doing so is by
placing power to draw electoral districts in the hands of
independent commissions. For example, in November 2018,
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

See supra Parts I–II.
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015).
Id. at 792–93.
576 U.S. 787 (2015).
Id. at 813.
Id. at 825–50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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voters in Colorado and Michigan approved constitutional
amendments creating multimember commissions that will be
responsible in whole or in part for creating and approving district
maps for congressional and state legislative districts. Missouri is
trying a different tack. Voters there overwhelmingly approved the
creation of a new position—state demographer—to draw state
legislative district lines.419
These measures are constitutionally indistinguishable from the ones put
at risk in Arizona.
Litigation on this question took center stage in the months leading up
to, and following, the 2020 general elections. Faced with the difficulties
of holding elections in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, governors,
secretaries of state, state election boards, county election administrators,
and courts issued executive orders, rules, and interpretations to ensure that
voters could safely cast ballots that would count. As a result, there were
at least forty-three cases, in both federal and state court, in which parties
challenged an election rule or procedure on the grounds that the entity
issuing the regulation or interpretation was not entitled to make rules as
to the times, places, or manner of federal elections under the Elections
and/or Electors Clauses.420 Opining on voting cases that bubbled up to the
Supreme Court’s 2020 “shadow docket,” four justices indicated their
support for the independent state legislature theory, under which only the
formal legislative body of a state would be permitted to regulate federal
elections under the Elections and Electors Clauses.421 These views
contradict the Court’s majority opinions in Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission and Rucho, the practice of election
administration nationally, and the unmistakable original intent of the
Elections Clause to limit the power of state lawmakers, whom the Framers
fundamentally distrusted. Ultimately, the Court denied the petitions for
certiorari arising from these cases.422
CONCLUSION: THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE TODAY
One remarkable feature of the Founding-era debates on the Elections
Clause is their resonance today. Madison’s well-known warning that
partisan factions in the States would write laws to entrench themselves

419. Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (citation omitted).
420. Voting Rights Litigation Tracker 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancent
er.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020 [https://perma.cc/TE5M-3QX5] (last
updated July 28, 2021).
421. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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still echoes profoundly: “Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite
measure to carry, they would take care so to mould [sic] their regulations
as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.”423
For example, rules to limit ballot-access—including stricter voter
identification requirements for in-person voting, stricter voter-registration
requirements, and curtailment of early-voting opportunities—are
advanced predominantly by one political party, often crafted to exclude
some voters, and based on a premise about the relationship between
turnout and electoral outcomes.424 At the same time, partisan
gerrymandering designed to entrench political parties has plagued
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
amidst the heightened partisanship of recent years,425 consistent with
Theophilus Parsons’ prediction that “in times of popular commotion, and
when faction and party spirit run high,” States “would introduce such
regulations as would render the rights of the people insecure and of little
value” including making “unequal and partial division of the State into
districts for the election of representatives.”426 Indeed, even as the
Supreme Court in Rucho ruled that claims of partisan gerrymandering are
nonjusticiable, the Court acknowledged that electoral districting problems
in part animated the Framers’ desire for the Elections Clause. And the
Court squarely stated that “the Framers gave Congress the power to do
something about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clause.”427 The
Court pointed specifically to the For the People Act of 2019 as an example
of proposed legislation that would create such districting regulations and
noted that the avenue for reform “remains open” in Congress.428
Along with redistricting reform, the For the People Act and the
Freedom to Vote Act include provisions related to methods of voter
registration, early voting, restoration of eligibility to people with past

423. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
424. Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370 (2015) (“[T]he single predictor
necessary to determine whether a state will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans
control the ballot-access process. This is not intended as a normative claim, but simply as a real-world
fact of life.”).
425. PEW RSCH. CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN WIDER 7
(2017), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/10-05-2017-Politicallandscape-release-updt..pdf [https://perma.cc/J9BV-KC9Z] (“The gap between the political values of
Democrats and Republicans is now larger than at any point in Pew Research Center surveys dating
back to 1994, a continuation of a steep increase in the ideological divisions between the two parties
over more than a decade.”).
426. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in VOL. 6:
MASSACHUSETTS 3, supra note 55, at 1218.
427. Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
428. Id.; see H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 2401, 2411 (2019).
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convictions, and election security.429 Arguments that the Elections Clause
is not broad enough to authorize these reforms would give the Framers
and early members of Congress déjà vu. For example, the president of the
Public Interest Legal Foundation testified that the Elections Clause “was
only added” to the Constitution “when concerns were raised that the states
would suffocate the power of the new government by refusing to establish
procedures to elect federal officials”—a circumstance that “simply does
not exist, and therefore should not justify a federal takeover of election
procedures.”430 Not only does this argument reflect a very narrow slice of
the historical record, but it has been advanced and defeated—repeatedly.
The Framers of the Constitution declined to adopt Rutledge and
Pinckney’s proposed amendment to excise federal authority to alter state
elections regulations. Then, during state ratification, six states tried and
failed to amend the constitution to limit Congress’s power to apply only
when States entirely failed to enact elections regulations. The first
Congress likewise tried and failed to amend the Constitution to grant
elections authority only in instances of state default. Rather than adopt
such a limited construction, Madison, the Framers, and early Congresses
understood (sometimes to their chagrin) that the Elections Clause
contained “words of great latitude” and that Congress’s authority was not
limited to circumstances in which states entirely refused to enact rules for
congressional elections. The national self-preservation that the Elections
Clause was intended to provide has always meant more than merely
holding congressional elections.431
Partisan manipulation of district boundaries is just one tactic used to
dilute the power of voters and suppress votes. Voters face myriad burdens
and inconveniences, from strict voter identification laws and registration
429. For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong.
(2021).
430. For the People Act: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3
(2019) (statement of J. Christian Adams, President and General Counsel, Public Interest Legal
Foundation), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20190129/108824/HHRG-116-JU00Wstate-AdamsJ-20190129-U1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7KX-N2BN].
431. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 800 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“[A]s much injury might
result to the Union from improper regulations, as from a neglect or refusal to many any.”); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 407 (1842) (“[T]he Government is almost as much dissolved by
a vicious representation as by no representation. In the latter case, to be sure, the whole fabric is
destroyed; in the former, you preserve the show, the appearance, the form of our Government, but the
spirit and lite are gone.”); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1283 (1871) (“Who does not know that
if the State Legislature should choose to incumber the exercise of this power with inconvenient or
impossible conditions, and if the national Congress had not the power to overrule or alter such
conditions, the nation would perish?”); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382 (1879) (“In the light of
recent history, and of the violence, fraud, corruption, and irregularity which have frequently prevailed
at such elections, it may easily be conceived that the exertion of the power, if it exists, may be
necessary to the stability of our frame of government.”).

Sweren-Becker & Waldman (Do Not Delete)

1066

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/11/2021 4:05 PM

[Vol. 96:997

requirements, to aggressive voter roll purges and limited voting hours and
locations. Framers who worried that States, if unrestricted, would situate
polling places at inconvenient locations would be unsurprised by the rash
of polling place closures since 2013, when the Supreme Court gutted the
federal government’s most potent tool for fighting race-based voter
suppression—the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act.432
Indeed, one essayist during the state ratification debates expressly warned
that, without federal mediation, a State would “appoint[] a place for
holding the elections, which would prevent some from attending, and
burthen [sic] others with very great inconveniences.”433
It is disheartening that abuse of state power over elections, partisan
manipulation of district lines, and myriad forms of voter intimidation and
suppression (precisely the harms the Framers hoped to avoid by drafting
the Elections Clause into the Constitution) persist. But there is reason for
optimism. The historical record of the Elections Clause—at the nation’s
founding, in early Congresses, and in the courts—demonstrates that
Congress and states have the power to deliver on the promise of free and
fair elections that the Framers intended.

432. See THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE
CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 12 (2019), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/DemocracyDiverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVL3-A8XT] (finding 1,688 polling place closures between 2012 and
2018 in jurisdictions formerly covered by the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act); Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (invalidating the formula that determined which states and
jurisdictions were covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and thus are required to undergo
preclearance, effectively ending the preclearance requirement).
433. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in
VOL. 5: MASSACHUSETTS 2, supra note 87, at 738.

